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I. Introduction and summary of findings 
 
During the 1990’s, Latin America experienced a wave of privatizations, which 
were an integral part of stabilization programs and a general reordering of the role of 
States in the regional economy.  Over the past few years, these privatizations have come 
under increasing fire.  The adverse effects ascribed to them range from an increase in 
utility service prices, to aggravating the recession currently affecting the region.  In short, 
they are sharing in criticism directed at the entire liberalization process. 
In this context, accurate knowledge as to the real consequences of privatization is 
of real value, but while there is research on some of its economic effects, there is less 
information on its broader “social” consequences.  The goal of this study is to try to fill in 
some of these gaps as they concern the case of Bolivia. 
The paper first describes the privatization process, placing emphasis on the 
particularities of the capitalization1 mechanism that was used for this purpose, and the 
regulatory framework introduced as its essential complement.2  With this background, the 
paper then details the changes in the industrial organization and ownership patterns in the 
electricity, oil and gas, telecommunications, transportation, and water industries.   
The discussion then turns to these processes’ economic and social consequences.  
In the first case, the key issues are which agents benefited from the transfer of assets, and 
the effects on firm-level variables like investment, profitability, and transfers to the State.  
With regards to social outcomes, we focus on the effects on employees and consumers.  
For the first, interest centers on what happened to employment and wages in the sectors 
affected; for the second, what occurred to access and prices for privatized utilities, and to 
welfare more generally. 
This paper touches on all these issues, although in several cases a full treatment is 
not possible due to data limitations.  What information is available, however, leads to the 
following broad conclusions (roughly in the order they appear in the text): 
 
1) By design, capitalization and privatization generated significant transfers of assets 
to foreign firms.  The Bolivian population was not excluded from this benefit, however, 
since it collectively received a 45 percent share in most of the transferred enterprises.  
Dividends from this ownership have been used to pay old-age benefits. 
2) These processes, combined with the introduction of a regulatory framework, seem 
to have delivered on their central stated goal: to substantially increase investment (as well 
as competition in some cases) in the sectors affected. 
3) These investments have been associated with significant increases in capacity and 
output – from improvements in utility access rates, to a ten-fold rise in gas and oil 
reserves within five years of the reforms.  
4) Productivity also increased significantly across all sectors, in part due to 
employment reductions.  We find, however, that these reductions were small relative to 
the economy as a whole.  Unless the indirect effects were very large, therefore, 
                                                 
1 The nature of these two processes, privatization and capitalization, is described in detail below.  In terms 
of the amount of assets transferred, the latter was clearly the more important.  In part because of this, the 
discussion often uses the two terms interchangeably. 
2 We emphasize that it was the combination of privatization/capitalization, on the one hand, and 
regulation, on the other, that were substituted for state ownership. 
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privatization simply cannot account for the increasing unemployment observed in recent 
years. 
5) Tax receipts from capitalized firms appear to have increased after reform.  In the 
current recession, however, there is pressure for further increases. 
6) While most capitalized firms do report positive profits, their returns on equity 
have declined in recent years, particularly during the ongoing recession.   
7) In the urban area and in terms of connection, the utility service expansions have 
not bypassed the poor.  On the contrary, in many cases it is the lower income quintiles 
that seem to have benefited the most.   
8) As far as the effects of pricing changes on households’ welfare, the available 
information does suggest some adverse effects.   
9) On balance, however, the access improvements seem to have outweighed negative 
price effects, resulting in greater consumer welfare in the cases of electricity and 
telephone services.  In the case of Water the results are mixed. 
10) The regulatory framework seems to have strengthened the rule of law and 
promoted competition and transparency in some sectors.  Nevertheless, it is still 
necessary to strengthen the regulatory and institutional framework. 
11) As elsewhere, privatization/capitalization and regulation were part and parcel of a 
broader restructuring of the economy.  In Bolivia, privatization lagged stabilization 
significantly, however, so it is not associated with the earliest macroeconomic effects.  
Nevertheless, it clearly is part of a shift in the State’s focus from productive to social 
sector activities. 
 
These findings provide a brief and admittedly incomplete evaluation of 
privatization in Bolivia, and we emphasize that it is impossible to fully disentangle its 
effects from those of associated events, like the introduction of regulatory frameworks. 
On the whole, our findings suggest that these reforms met with relative success.  
The fact remains, however, that they are not popular, at least to judge by poll results and 
politicians’ pronouncements.  In the final part of this paper we provide a few hypothesis 
for this, as well as some details on the political economy of these reforms. 
An aspect we highlight is the popular suspicion that even if output and 
productivity have improved, the capitalized enterprises are being run with only the best 
interests of the majority (foreign) owners in mind, and that the regulatory system has 
been unable to adequately restrain this natural tendency. 
This standard issue has gained salience in Bolivia because, as stated, the 
population collectively owns a 45 percent share in capitalized firms, and the dividends 
accruing to this ownership are used to finance old-age benefits.  Because these dividends 
have been declining (partially due to a recession), the amounts collected have been 
insufficient to adequately fund benefits in the amount promised initially.    
Another issue we emphasize is our impression that the government that 
implemented these reforms “oversold” them, promising more, on the job creation front 
for instance, than they could reasonably deliver.  Finally, the reform’s entire reputation 
has been hurt by a couple of high profile failures, one regarding the national airline and 
another a water concession in the city of Cochabamba. 
None of these issues might have been salient in a healthy economic environment, 
but in the economic slowdown Bolivia has been experiencing since 1999, they have 
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significantly contributed to privatization’s bad reputation.  Additionally, the recent 
worldwide focus on corporate malfeasance has helped bring them to the forefront. 
 
II. Capitalization/privatization:  The process and its direct effects 
 
Bolivia initiated significant economic liberalizations in 1985, primarily in an 
effort to tame hyperinflation and emerge from a deep recession.  Despite success with 
these early market-friendly initiatives, the country did not engage in significant and 
sustained privatization until about ten years later.  When it finally embarked on this 
process, the government employed traditional privatization in some instances, but mainly 
relied on capitalization as a mechanism for the transfer of State-owned firms.   
This section first describes how these approaches differ, and how the introduction 
of regulatory mechanisms served as a key complement to both of them.  For each of the 
sectors affected by this reform, the discussion also details changes in industrial 
organization and regulatory arrangements.  Finally, this section discusses changes in 
ownership patterns brought about by these reforms.3 
 
A. Capitalization and privatization:  general overview 
 
Under traditional privatization, the government transfers a majority of ownership 
in a State firm to the private sector, and has freedom over how to spend the proceeds.  
Under capitalization, the State transfers shares equivalent to 50 percent of the firm to the 
investor with the winning bid.  It also yields about 45 percent to private pension fund 
administrators who represent the general citizenry, and who use the funds derived from 
this share to pay old-age benefits complementary to those stemming from individual 
retirement accounts.4  The remaining 5 percent accrues to the company’s employees.   
By its payment, the investor gains the right to manage the firm, and commits to 
investing its capital contribution, the amount it offered for its 50 percent share, in the 
firm’s development.  It must carry this out within a specified period (typically six to eight 
years), agree to fulfill obligations that encompass expansion and quality goals, and 
operate under regulation and a long-term (typically 40 year) contract. 
Under this scheme, therefore, investment is given a high priority, and the 
government gains no disposable income.  This reflects the fact that having come 
relatively late in Bolivia’s liberalization, capitalization was not seen as a means to cover 
deficits, but rather as a way to attract foreign investment and improve management in key 
areas of the economy.   
Taken together, capitalization and privatization raised significant amounts of 
capital:  total commitments add up to about two billion dollars, roughly equivalent to 30 
percent of GDP.  Capitalization accounted for most of these proceeds, however, 1.7 
billion dollars, as opposed to 0.3 billion for privatization5.   
                                                 
3 Parts of this section are drawn from Barja and Urquiola (2001).  For additional information, see also 
Baldivia (1998) and Pierce (1997). 
4 As this suggests, a reform to the pensions system accompanied capitalization in Bolivia.   
5 While privatization started in 1992 with about 50% of its proceeds concentrated in 1999, capitalization 
occurred in the 1994-1997 period.  Also 61% of privatization proceeds came from sectors where 
capitalization occurred. 
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B.  Regulation as a complementary reform 
 
Capitalization was complemented with reforms to each sector’s industrial 
organization, and with a regulatory framework that by design, seeks to promote 
competition and efficiency.6  The key legislation was the SIRESE7 Law (1994), which 
created a regulatory system for the infrastructure sector.  In essence, it defines the 
institutional structure, including the role of five regulatory agencies (Superintendencias) 
for the electricity, telecommunications, hydrocarbons (oil and gas), potable water, and 
transportation industries.  Additionally, it sets up an overseeing agency responsible for 
system-wide coordination, appeals and evaluation; and introduces market competition as 
one of the guiding principles in the infrastructure sector. 
Four more specific laws round out this framework:  Electricity (1994), 
Telecommunications (1995), Hydrocarbons (1996) and Potable Water (2000).  These 
introduced changes in each sector’s industrial organization, and govern aspects related to 
tariff regulation, entry, service quality, and sanctions.  The sector-specific regulatory 
agencies created as part of SIRESE administer each law. 
 
C. Changes in industrial organization and regulatory arrangements 
 
In addition to introducing regulatory frameworks for each sector, the laws 
described changed its industrial organization.  This section describes the specific changes 
implemented in each case. 
 
1. Electricity 
 
Prior to reform, the electricity industry was divided into the National 
Interconnected System (NIS) and other independent networks, a distinction which 
remains today.  The NIS covers the largest cities, while the other networks serve other 
urban and some rural areas.8  This paper focuses on the NIS9, where the State-owned 
ENDE10 was active in generation and transmission.  Additionally, it had some distribution 
activities, mainly through ELFEC11 in the city of Cochabamba.  COBEE12, a private 
company, participated in generation and distribution in the cities of La Paz and Oruro.  
Other distribution firms or cooperatives were, CRE13 in Santa Cruz, SEPSA14 in Potosí 
                                                 
6 For more on regulation and regulatory institutions in Bolivia, see Barja (2000) and SIRESE (2000). 
7 Sistema de Regulación Sectorial. 
8 This distinction will be used extensively.  In Bolivia, the main cities are the department capitals.  The 
three largest have populations close to one million and form the so-called central axis:  Cochabamba, La 
Paz/El Alto, and Santa Cruz.  Unlike most of its neighbors, therefore, Bolivia does not have a single 
dominant urban center, and has one of the lowest urban concentration ratios in the region.   
9 Which accounts for close to 90% of electricity consumption. 
10 Empresa Nacional de Electricidad. 
11 Empresa de Luz y Fuerza Electrica Cochabamba. 
12 Compañía Boliviana de Energía Eléctrica. 
13 Cooperativa Rural Eléctrica. 
14 Servicios Eléctricos de Potosí, a municipal company. 
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and CESSA15 in Sucre.  Competition existed only between ENDE and COBEE, and was 
limited to the direct provision of electricity to a few mining and industrial concerns. 
The Electricity Law vertically separated generation, transmission, and 
distribution, with some firms privatized in each of these.  Table 1 describes the firms that 
were created by privatization and capitalization, the year in which they were created, the 
value they were transferred for, and the buyer. 
 
Table 1 
Buyers and sale values for capitalized and privatized firms:  Electricity 
 
Firms created by the reform Year Privatization 
value 
(Millions of 
$us) 
Capitali- 
zation value 
(Millions of 
$us) 
Original buyer 
Corani S.A.  
Guaracachi S.A.  
Valle Hermoso S.A.  
Transportadora de Electricidad S.A. 
Elfec S.A.  
1995 
1995 
1995 
1997 
1995 
 
 
 
39.90 
50.30 
58.79 
47.13 
33.92 
Dominion Energy, Inc. 
Energy Initiatives, Inc. 
Constellation Energy, Inc. 
Union Fenosa 
EMEL, S.A. 
Total 90.20 139.84  
 
In generation, capitalization created three firms:  Corani, Guaracachi and Valle 
Hermoso, with a total value of about 140 million dollars.  Each of these received part of 
ENDE’s generation activities, with the law limiting the market share each can achieve to 
35 percent of the NIS market.  Exclusive rights were initially granted to these companies, 
but by 1999 entry was liberalized and some small firms joined the market. 
In transmission, network operation was passed from ENDE to the private 
Transportadora de Electricidad, without exclusive rights.  Additionally, the Electricity 
Law forbids the participation of transmission firms in purchase or sale activities, and 
establishes open access and tariff regulation. 
In distribution, several types of firms exist after the reform, all of which operate 
under tariff regulation and are subject to quality controls.  First, there is CRE, a pre-
existing distribution cooperative that remained as an independent regional monopoly.  
Second, there are pre-existing municipal distribution firms that also retained their 
monopolies:  CESSA and SEPSA.  ELFEC, previously a municipal company, now 
operates as a private firm.  Finally, as stated, the private COBEE operated in both 
generation and distribution.  Its divestiture from distribution produced two private local 
distributors, ELECTROPAZ (La Paz), and ELFEO (Oruro).  For all of these distribution 
firms, tariff regulation consists of several average cost caps with productivity factors set 
using a four-year lag.   Tariffs are updated every semester to allow for “pass-through” of 
energy cost increases. 
These reforms, together with the introduction of a load dispatch coordination 
office, have created a wholesale electricity market that seeks to simulate competitive 
conditions.  As a result the NIS is experiencing excess capacity since 1999. 
 
2. Oil and gas 
 
                                                 
15 Compañía Eléctrica Sucre, a municipal company. 
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Prior to reform, virtually all the hydrocarbons (oil and natural gas) industry was 
under the control of State-owned YPFB16, a vertically integrated monopoly.  Limited 
private participation in exploration, as well as in crude oil and natural gas production 
took place through joint ventures with this company. 
With the capitalization process and the introduction of the Hydrocarbons Law, the 
priority became to remove YPFB from production, and to promote a natural gas export 
industry directed towards southern Brazil.  The State intended this industry to support 
(through taxes and royalties) the development of other sectors of the economy, and with 
this goal in mind, reforms and foreign investment were focused on exploration and 
infrastructure.  The inauguration of a pipeline to Brazil in 1999 made this vision a reality.  
Further, these reforms were associated with a substantial increase in natural gas 
reserves.  Proven and probable reserves increased from 5.69 TCF17 in 1997, to 52.3 TCF 
in 2002, putting Bolivia in first place in Latin America as far as free reserves are 
concerned.  With reserves now exceeding the Brazilian and domestic market, the 
Bolivian government is considering a new list of projects, including liquefied natural gas 
exports to the U.S. and Mexico18, petrochemical and thermoelectric plants, and new 
export pipelines to Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Chile. 19 
As for the domestic market, a general policy of private control of all phases up to 
retail commercialization was adopted.  Table 2 describes the firms that were created by 
privatization and capitalization. 
 
Table 2 
Buyers and sale values for capitalized and privatized firms:  Oil and natural gas 
 
Firms created by the 
reform 
Year Privatization 
value 
(Millions of 
$us) 
Capitalization 
value 
(Millions of 
$us) 
Original buyer 
Chaco S.A.  
Andina S.A.  
Transredes S.A.  
EBR S.A.  
CLHB S.A. 
Airport service stations 
1997 
1997 
1997 
2000 
2000 
2000 
 
 
 
102.00 
  12.05 
  11.10 
306.66 
264.77 
263.50 
Amoco 
YPF-Pérez Compac-Plus Petrol 
Enron-Shell 
Petrobras 
Oil Tanking 
Private 
Total  125.15 834.93  
 
To implement these objectives, the Hydrocarbons Law requires that exploration, 
production and commercialization (upstream) be executed only by private firms in joint 
ventures with YPFB (remaining as the upstream regulator), while placing few restrictions 
on the export and import of petroleum products.  The most important operators20 in the 
                                                 
16 Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos. 
17 Trillion Cubic Feet. 
18 Given Bolivia’s landlocked condition, at present one of the most debated issues is the choice of an export 
port in either Chile or Peru. 
19 An important distributional issue has arisen from the fact that most of new reserves are in the Department 
of Tarija (which already concentrated most exports to Brazil), which will now receive most of the royalty 
revenues. 
20 Representing shares of a group of firms. 
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upstream, in terms of the natural gas reserves they hold (by 2001 data), are:  Petrobras 
(34.8%), Maxus (29%), Total Exploration (19.8%), Andina (5.9%) and Chaco (4.6%). 
The 1996 Hydrocarbons law stipulates that the government is entitled to a share of 
the value of production which depends on whether the field in question was discovered 
before or after capitalization:  50% of the value of production from old fields (at 
wellhead), and 18% from new fields21.  In both cases firms are also required to pay a 25% 
profit tax, a 25% surtax22 and a 12.5% remittance tax. 
In the downstream area, the gas and oil pipelines were transferred to the 
capitalized Transredes, without exclusive rights.23  The administration of other pipelines 
(poliductos) was entrusted to the private Oil Tanking, with the remaining still under 
YPFB control.  In refinement, most of YPFB’s units were transferred to the private 
Empresa Boliviana de Refinación (EBR).24 
In commercialization, YPFB’s storage terminals were transferred to CLHB25 of 
Oil Tanking as well, but other private firms are also active.  Bottled liquefied gas 
distribution plants are all private, and about 85 percent of bottling capacity continues 
under YPFB, but is expected to be privatized.  Compressed natural gas service stations 
are all private, and about 15 percent of service stations for liquids continue under the 
State firm.  Airport service stations nationwide where also transferred to the private 
sector.  Diesel and other lubricants are imported by private firms. 
Mixed ownership continues in network-based natural gas distribution:  SERGAS26 
in Santa Cruz, EMCOGAS27 in Cochabamba, EMDIGAS28 in Sucre and EMTAGAS29 in 
Tarija.  YPFB operates in La Paz, Potosi and Oruro.  These companies are expected to be 
fully privatized in the future.30  Despite this activity, the network-based natural gas 
industry is still underdeveloped: by 2001 it included only 14,435 connections.  
Nevertheless, current policy is to increase this to up to 250,000 connections in the next 
five years, as part of an effort to change the energy consumption pattern in favor of 
natural gas. 
Except for restrictions to vertical integration imposed on firms in gas pipeline 
transportation, the industry structure is flexible and determined by export market needs, 
although mergers and acquisitions are subject to approval.  This has permitted Petrobras, 
in association with others, to integrate several of the phases directed to the natural gas 
exports to Brazil, at the same time as this company participates through EBR in 
refinement for the domestic market. 
                                                 
21 The 1990 Hydrocarbons Law required that all fields pay 50% in royalties, plus a profit tax. 
22 The surtax base is equal to the profit tax base minus 33% of accumulated investments and minus 45% of 
the value of production at each field up to a maximum of $40 million per year. 
23 According to 2000 data, Transredes held 100% of oil pipelines and 69.8% of gas pipelines.  Other 
important operators in gas pipelines are Gas Trans Boliviano with 15.1% and Gas Oriente Boliviano with 
9.8%, the first administers the main export pipeline to Brazil through Corumba and the latter the second 
export pipeline to Brazil through Cuiaba.  In addition, later that year Petrobras iniciated construction of the 
San Alberto-Yabog gas pipeline and the San Alberto-OCY1 oil pipeline. 
24 Owned by the Accidental Association Petrobras Bolivia S.A. 
25 Compañía Logística de Hidrocarburos Boliviana  
26 Empresa de Servicios de Gas Santa Cruz S.A.M. 
27 Empresa Cochabambina de Gas S.A.M. 
28 Empresa Distribuidora de Gas Sucre S.A.M. 
29 Empresa Tarijeña de Gas. 
30 The first privatization attempt failed in April 2002. 
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Rate of return regulation (with a four year lag) is used for pipeline transportation, 
with a tariff structure that differentiates between domestic and export-related 
transportation.  In natural gas network distribution, tariff regulation has not been 
implemented thus far.  Consumer prices for all petroleum derivatives were initially 
calculated by starting with an international price reference, and then adding the costs of 
processing, transportation and commercialization -- plus an oil derivatives tax.  Due to 
price volatility, liquefied gas, diesel oil, and gasoline are subsidized since 2000.  Further, 
in a recent decree, the government froze all consumer prices, eliminated the refining 
margin, and increased the oil derivatives tax -- with the effect of lowering the price for 
the upstream firms. 
 
3. Telecommunications 
 
Prior to reforms, the telecommunications industry was divided between ENTEL,31 
which covered national and international long distance services, 15 cooperatives with 
monopolies in fixed local telephone services, and Telecel, a private monopoly in the 
cellular market.  The Telecommunications Law maintained this separation until entry was 
liberalized at the end of 2001.  Until then, ENTEL and the cooperatives retained exclusive 
rights, but the mobile market was opened to competition by allowing the entry of 
ENTEL-Movil32 in 1996, and Nuevatel-Viva33 in 2000.  Table 3 presents the basic aspects 
of the ENTEL capitalization. 
  
Table 3 
Buyers and sale values for capitalized and privatized firms:  Telecommunications 
 
Firms created by the 
reform 
Year Privatization 
value 
(Millions of 
$us) 
Capitalization 
value 
(Millions of 
$us) 
Original buyer 
ENTEL S.A. 1995  610.00 ETI Euro Telecom.. N.V. 
Total   610.00  
 
For the period prior to entry liberalization, legislation mandated tariff regulation 
for firms that control more than 60 percent of a given market.  This scheme had a similar 
structure in all areas, establishing an initial price cap for different baskets of services, 
adjusted for inflation and a productivity factor with a three-year lag.  Further, the law 
stipulated annual expansion, quality, and technological goals up to 2000. 
November 2001 marked the end of exclusive rights in all markets.34  Entry 
occurred in the long distance market through AES Corporation (in association with 
Cotel), Teledata, a division of COTAS, Boliviatel, a division of COMTECO, Telecel, 
Nuevatel and ITS.  Additionally, Cotas-Movil has entered the mobile market, while Entel 
has expanded its local network to business clients.  Most of these companies are also 
aggressively entering the data transmission and internet market.  Up to the end of 2001, 
registers show 17 firms providing public phone services, 12 firms providing pager 
                                                 
31 Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, the State monopoly. 
32 A division of capitalized ENTEL. 
33 A joint venture between COMTECO (the Cochabamba cooperative) and Western Wireless International. 
34 The so-called Decretos de la Apertura where approved by the government a year before. 
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services, 40 in value added services, 33 in signal distribution, 272 in television, 572 radio 
stations, 13 in data transmission, 232 in radio-taxi services and 512 private nets. 
Additionally, market liberalization was accompanied by a four-year restriction on 
mergers, acquisitions and stock swaps that account for 40% or more of total local fixed 
lines in service in the country by one firm (or a group of related firms).  Tariff regulation 
continues where a firm controls more then 60 percent of a given market, and new rules 
are to be implemented to facilitate inter-connection agreements.  A Universal Access and 
Service Fund has also been proposed, and would be financed mainly by operators’ 
contribution of 3.5 percent of their annual gross income.   
 
4. Transportation 
 
As elsewhere, the Bolivian transportation industry is divided into air, rail, road 
and water segments.  Thus far, capitalization and regulation have only affected the first 
two.  Additionally, the long waited new Transportation Law has not been approved. 
In the air market, prior to reform the State-owned LAB 35 and the private 
AEROSUR36 competed in the main regular route domestic market.  LAB also participated 
in the international market, and the national airport system was administered by the state 
monopoly AASANA.37  LAB was capitalized to the Brazilian VASP (see Table 4), and the 
main three airport terminals of Viru Viru in Santa Cruz, El Alto in La Paz and J. 
Wilsterman in Cochabamba, were transferred to the private SABSA38 as concessions.  
AASANA retains administrative control of 34 small airports, and AEROSUR has recently 
entered the international market with flights to Argentina. 
In the case of rail, before reform the sector was dominated by the state monopoly 
ENFE,39 which administered passenger and freight services in the Andean and Eastern 
regions.  In this case, reform created two separate regional firms, FCA40 and FCO,41 
which where then capitalized (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4 
Buyers and sale values for capitalized and privatized firms:  Transportation 
 
Firms created by the 
reform 
Year Privatization 
value 
(Millions of 
$us) 
Capitalization 
value 
(Millions of 
$us) 
Original buyer 
LAB S.A. (14) 
FCO S.A. (15) 
FCA S.A. (15) 
1997 
1996 
1996 
47.47 
25.85 
13.25 
VASP 
Cruz Blanca 
Cruz Blanca 
Total   86.57  
 
                                                 
35 Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano. 
36 Compañía Boliviana de Transporte Aéreo Privado. 
37 Administración de Aeropuertos y Servicios Auxiliares a la Navegación Aérea. 
38 Servicios Aeroportuarios Bolivianos. 
39 Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles. 
40 Empresa Ferroviaria Andina. 
41 Empresa Ferroviaria Oriental. 
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The lack of a sector law has limited the regulatory activities of the Transportation 
Superintendence.  Nevertheless, it was able to advance some actions based on existing 
norms and a few government decrees.  In air transportation, a tariff band was placed for 
the regular domestic market, with the stated objective of discouraging anticompetitive 
practices.  Some airport terminal tariffs are also regulated.  In rail transportation, there are 
regulations concerning economic, technical and security aspects of service.  In urban road 
transportation, maximum reference tariffs were also put in place.  
 
5. Water 
 
While the above sectors experienced capitalization and the introduction of 
regulation, the water industry has undergone limited changes and encountered significant 
difficulties.  Only one municipal firm, SAMAPA (La Paz/El Alto), was transferred as a 
concession in 1997, to Aguas del Illimani.42  Under the new model, the concession seeks 
to improve internal efficiency, coverage, and quality.  The characteristics of the Aguas 
del Illimani contract reflect this, and the objectives established for the 1997-2001 period 
included: i) 100 percent access to potable water or sewerage (excluding public fountains) 
in the areas of Achachicala and Pampahasi, in the city of La Paz, ii) 82 percent access to 
potable water in the city of El Alto by 2001, of which 50 percent should be expansion 
connections, and 41 percent access to sewerage; and iii) compliance with long-term 
expansion goals.  Quality norms cover aspects related to the sources of water, its quality, 
abundance and pressure; continuity of service, infrastructure efficiency, customer service, 
and emergency preparedness.  Tariff regulation was established under a rate of return 
mechanism with a five-year regulatory lag and no productivity factors.  Additionally, 
tariffs were set in dollar terms payable in bolivianos.43 
The expectation was that within a short period, legislation would be in place to 
incorporate the remaining firms into a similar model.  However, the long wait for a  
Potable Water and Sewerage Law (finally approved in 2000), together with significant 
failure in a second transfer of a municipal firm (SEMAPA) to Aguas del Tunari44 in 
Cochabamba, significantly slowed change in this sector.45   
Nevertheless, up to 2000 the Water Superintendence was able to incorporate the 
new regulatory regime and sign concessions with existing municipal water firms in 
Cochabamba, Oruro, Sucre, and Potosi -- and with existing cooperatives in Santa Cruz, 
Montero, Trinidad and Guayaramerin.  Some features of the new Law are that municipal 
                                                 
42 The main shareholder is Lyonnaise Des Eaux, with 35 percent. 
43 This last feature has generated wide protest from the inhabitants of El Alto. 
44 A private firm with the British International Water (with 55 percent) as the main shareholder. 
45 The difficulties started when Aguas del Tunari implemented a tariff increase that averaged 38 percent 
(from a minimum of –11% to a maximum of 117%).  Given the reorganization of consumer categories, 
however, in practice the maximum increase experienced by some consumers was in the order of 300 to 500 
percent, which naturally generated much opposition.  In addition, the exclusive rights granted to this firm in 
many cases affected local interests, particularly of those who invested in private wells and distribution 
mechanisms.   An added element was that Aguas del Tunari had to invest 200 million dollars in the popular 
Misicuni water provision project, 30 percent of which had to come from equity and the rest from debt.  The 
tariff increase occurred while the company had not yet complied with the equity commitment, and the debt 
financing had yet to be lined up.  The perception arose that the firm was trying to finance its equity from 
tariff increases.  The so-called “water war” was the local reaction of strikes and demonstrations that ended 
with the expulsion of Aguas del Tunari from Cochabamba. 
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governments are responsible for the provision of water and sewerage services, a 
responsibility they can perform through private or municipal firms, cooperatives, civil 
organizations and any existing organization in rural communities.  The Bolivian 
population is divided between areas subject to concession or not, depending whether they 
are financially viable.  Concessions are subject to rate of return regulation with a five 
year regulatory lag and efficiency goals, while universal access in non-concession areas 
should be accomplished with government investment. 
 
D. Further ownership effects 
 
Capitalization transferred 50 percent of state enterprises (and their control) to 
foreign firms.  Additionally, 45-50 percent of shares in the capitalized firms were given 
to the Collective Capitalization Fund (CCF), to be held for the benefit of the population 
at large.  Table 5 lists the enterprises capitalized in the utilities and hydrocarbons sectors, 
the number of shares issued and the distribution of these, by December 2001, between the 
capitalizing firm (always 50 percent), the CCF (46.4 percent on average), and the 
employees of each enterprise (3.6 percent on average and decreasing).  It bears repeating 
that in the second case the shares are made out to the CCF and are represented by the 
private pension fund administrators – they are not owned by these administrators, the 
State, or any individual citizen. 
 
Table 5 
Distribution of share ownership for the capitalized firms 
 
Firm (Sector) 
 
 
 
Total 
number of 
shares 
 
% owned by
the 
capitalizing 
firm 
% owned by 
the CCF and 
represented by the 
fund admistrators 
% owned 
by 
the firms’ 
workers 
 Ferroviaria Oriental (Transportation) 2,296,982 50 49.91 0.09 
 Ferroviaria Andina (Transportation) 1,322,448 50 49.93 0.07 
 Valle Hermoso (Electricity) 2,927,322 50 49.87 0.13 
 Guaracachi (Electricity) 3,358,284 50 49.83 0.17 
 Corani (Electricity) 3,144,486 50 47.23 2.77 
 Transredes (Oil and gas) 10,048,120 50 33.55 16.45 
 Petrolera Chaco (Oil and gas) 16,099,320 50 48.94 1.06 
 Petrolera Andina (Oil and gas) 13,439,520 50 48.92 1.08 
 ENTEL (Telecommunications) 12,808,988 50 47.47 2.53 
 LAB  (Transport.) 2,293,764 50 48.64 0.99 
 Mean 50 46.42 3.57 
Fuente:  Boletín de Pensiones 1999, Superintendencia de Pensiones, Valores y seguros. 
 
The CCF receives the dividends due to it from its shares in the capitalized and 
regulated firms.  Between 1997 and 1999, these dividends represented between 0.4 and 
0.5 percent of GDP per year, with the most important contribution coming from the 
telecommunications sector, as described in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Annual dividends received by the pension  
fund administrators from the CCF 
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     Source:  Boletín de Pensiones 2000, SPVS. 
 
 The fund has a significant social impact as a source of transfers to private citizens.  
These include the Bonosol (an old-age benefit), funeral expenses, investment in 
Individual Capitalization Funds (pension plans actually owned by individual citizens), 
and subsequently, the Bolivida.  The Bonosol, was a cash payment equivalent to 248 
dollars in 1997, directed at all citizens 65 or older – a substantial transfers given that 
Bolivia’s GDP per capita is about 1,000 dollars.46.   In total, 56.5 million dollars were 
paid to about 320,000 people.   
 The Bonosol was only paid once before the administration that implemented the 
capitalization process left government.  Immediately a debate began on whether the CCF 
in fact had enough funds to continue payments at that pace. The next administration did 
not make payments for a period and then switched to the Bolivida, which began being 
paid in December of 2000, and consists of 60 dollars for every citizen above the age of 
65.  Retroactive payments for 1998 and 1999 (60 dollars per year) were also made, and 
by March of 2001 had benefited 150,000 individuals. 
 The year 2002 witnessed the return to government of the administration that 
originally implemented Capitalization, and hence a desire to return to the original 
(roughly 240 dollar) Bonosol.  Because of the further reductions in the flow of dividends, 
however, the CCF now clearly does not have sufficient funds to make the promised 
payments.  We return to this issue, including how the government plans to make up the 
shortfall, in section VI below. 
 
III. Effects:  Firms’ performance  
 
 Capitalization and privatization entailed major changes to the industrial 
organization of the sectors they affected, and to the conditions under which the firms in 
                                                 
46  By December 31, 1999, the CCF had also been used to acquire shares of the ICF for approximately 14.7 
million, and for the payment of funeral expenses worth 2.3 million dollars. 
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each of them operate.  In this section, we study these reforms’ effects on several aspects 
of firm performance. 
 
A. Investment 
 
Investment is a key parameter in any evaluation of the capitalization process, 
since increasing it was one of its explicit objectives.  Table 6 summarizes the sector-
specific information presented earlier, but complements it with the investment activity 
observed in each case.  The privatization values presented correspond only to the oil and 
gas, electricity, telecommunications and transportation sectors. 
 
Table 6 
Resources/investment generated by privatization and capitalization 
 
Firms created by the 
reform 
Year Privatization 
value 
(Millions of 
$us) 
Capitalization 
value 
(Millions of 
$us) 
Investment as 
of 2001 
(as % of 
commitment)
Company / 
institution in 
charge of 
investment 
Oil and gas 
Chaco S.A.  
Andina S.A. 
Transredes S.A. 
EBR S.A. 
CLHB S.A. 
Airport Service Stations 
 
1997 
1997 
1997 
2000 
2000 
2000 
 
 
 
 
102.00 
  12.05 
  11.10 
 
306.66 
264.77 
263.50 
 
131.6 
130.0 
         84.1 
 
Chaco S.A. 
Andina S.A. 
Transredes S.A. 
TGN-Investment 
TGN-Investment 
TGN-Investment 
Electricity 
Corani S.A. 
Guaracachi S.A. 
Valle Hermoso S.A. 
TDE S.A. 
Elfec S.A. 
 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1997 
1995 
 
 
 
 
  39.90 
  50.30 
 
  58.79 
  47.13 
  33.92 
 
  85.1 
154.3 
110.9 
 
Corani S.A. 
Guaracachi S.A. 
Valle Hermoso S.A. 
ENDE Residual 
TGN-Investment 
Telecommunications 
ENTEL S.A. 
 
1995 
  
610.00 
(1) 
  76.9 
 
ENTEL S.A. 
Transportation 
LAB S.A. 
FCO S.A. 
FCA S.A. 
 
1997 
1996 
1996 
  
  47.47 
  25.85 
  13.25 
(1) 
         95.5 
129.1 
108.6 
 
LAB S.A. 
FCO S.A. 
FCA S.A. 
Total  215.35     1,671.34   
(1) Investment as of 2000 as % of commitment. 
 
As this table illustrates, most firms have exceeded their investment commitments, 
and from this perspective the process seems to have delivered.  Firms under concession 
agreements (Aguas del Illimani, and SABSA), furthermore, have also made investments in 
order to comply with specific contractual goals that are not registered in the table.   
 
B. Employment and labor productivity 
 
A frequent critique of privatization is that it leads to unemployment.  In this 
section, we use administrative information to explore the extent to which this is true for 
Bolivia.  As context, figure 1a shows that the economy-wide unemployment rate went up 
significantly after 1997, roughly doubling by 1999.  Naturally, external or other 
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macroeconomic shocks may account for this; we postpone a discussion of these until 
section V.  The focus in this section is simply to see if the employment changes brought 
about by privatization and capitalization could account for this change.  Due to data 
restrictions, in this section we arrive only at a partial answer.  Additionally, we include 
information on the evolution of labor productivity, and once again we first proceed 
through the analysis by sector. 
 
 Figure 1a:  Unemployment rate in Bolivia 
(As a percentage of economically active population) 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
 
1. Electricity 
 
Table 7 presents the evolution of the employment level in each of the generation 
firms that make up the National Interconnected System (NIS), along with a labor 
productivity measure for each company.  Between-firm comparisons must be made 
keeping in mind that these companies differ along dimensions including generation 
technology (thermo- or hydroelectric), and scale.  The table shows that the number of 
employees in each firm remained more or less constant between 1995 and 1998, with 
some decline by 1999.  Associated with increasing production, these trends have resulted 
in increases in labor productivity, which for the four years between 1995 and 1999, range 
between 14 and 100 percent. 
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Table 7 
Employment levels and mean labor productivity in the electric (generation) sector 
 
Firm 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
ENDE 
Number of employees 
GWh/employee 
 
537 
2.38 
539
2.66
541
3.12
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
 
n/a 
n/a 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a
n/a
Corani S.A. 
Number of employees 
GWh/ employee 
 
69
6.4
68
8.4
65
10.6
67
9.1
 
58 
12.8 
 
48 
16.1 
48
17.6
Valle Hermoso S.A. 
Number of employees 
GWh/ employee 
 
60
6.7
59
7.3
60
11.5
60
14.3
 
62 
10.3 
 
61 
9.5 
46
3.0
Guaracachi S.A. 
Number of employees 
GWh/ employee 
 
72
13.9
70
14.4
71
11.7
46
13.8
 
68 
15.9 
 
65 
14.2 
63
13.3
COBEE S.A. 
Number of employees 
GWh/ employee 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
835
n/a
285
3.0
285
3.0
279
3.1
 
240 
3.9 
 
228 
4.7 
219
5.4
TDE-Transmisión 
Number of employees 
Km. Trans. Lines/ employee 
 
128
15.22
110
17.69
 
n/a 
n/a 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a
n/a
Note:  The data refer to December of each year.  The capitalized enterprises began operations in August of 1995.  
COBEE in 1995 still included generation and distribution. 
 
 Table 8 presents analogous information for distribution firms.47  As it illustrates, 
the distribution enterprises can be roughly split into two groups according to their size.  
ELECTROPAZ, CRE and ELFEC, which operate in the three largest cities (La Paz/Elto, 
Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba, respectively), and CESSA, SEPSA and ELFEO, which 
operate in smaller markets.  The table reveals an overall downward trend in employment 
and a more consistent, increasing trend for labor productivity.  In La Paz/El Alto, for 
instance ELECTROPAZ consistently reduced its employment level between 1996 and 
1999, and increased its productivity by 59 percent in the same period.  In Santa Cruz, 
CRE reduced personnel up to 1997 and raised its productivity by 43 percent (it increased 
employment in 1998, but this did not reverse the productivity increases).  In 
Cochabamba, ELFEC reduced employment up to 1998, and increased its productivity by 
105 percent in the same period.  Two firms, CRE and SEPSA, actually increased their 
employment levels between 1995 and the most recent observation. 
 
                                                 
47 Once again, between-firm comparisons must be made with caution due to differences in characteristics 
including network size, and market density. 
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Table 8 
Employment levels and mean labor productivity in the electric (distribution) sector 
 
Firm 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 
2000 2001 
CRE 
Number of employees 
GWh/employee 
 
449 
1.1 
510
1.1
523
1.2
509
1.4
498
1.6
490
1.8
513
1.9
 
473 
2.2 
 
532 
2.0 
525
2.0
ELECTROPAZ 
Number of employees 
GWh/ employee 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
362
2.1
281
2.9
267
3.2
 
257 
3.5 
 
268 
3.4 
266
3.4
ELFEC 
Number of employees 
GWh/ employee 
 
294 
0.95 
313
0.97
326
1.04
322
1.15
310
1.31
313
1.4
236
2.1
 
227 
2.3 
 
229 
2.3 
237
2.3
CESSA 
Number of employees 
GWh/ employee 
 
130 
0.52 
131
0.56
149
0.52
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
110
0.8
109
0.9
 
123 
0.8 
 
109 
0.9 
109
0.9
SEPSA 
Number of employees 
GWh/ employee 
 
92 
0.37 
92
0.43
94
0.47
92
0.57
91
0.67
95
0.7
96
0.9
 
104 
0.8 
 
102 
0.8 
110
0.7
ELFEO 
Number of employees 
GWh/ employee 
 
105 
0.67 
106
0.69
111
0.69
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
76
2.2
69
2.7
 
64 
3.0 
 
64 
2.9 
64
3.0
Fuente:  Elaboración propia. 
 
 To summarize, both generation and distribution firms seem to, on average, have 
experienced relatively moderate decreases in employment levels, particularly two or three 
years after they initiated operations, while at the same time enjoying significant and 
consistent increases in labor productivity.   
 
2. Telecommunications 
 
 Table 9 includes similar data for firms in the telecommunications sector.  These 
are grouped according to their main line of business: long distance, cellular, or fixed line 
phone connections. All operators offer some additional service, such as internet 
connections or cable television.  Nevertheless, we calculated the labor productivity 
indicator only with respect to the main line of business.  An exception is ENTEL, for 
which we separate out cellular services.  Although we do not have the necessary 
information to make this separation for the entire period, one can always consider total 
ENTEL employment.  
 
 
Table 9 
Employment and labor productivity among the main telecommunications firms 
 
Firm 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 
Long distance 
ENTEL(1) 
Total employment 
Long distance minutes/employee 
 
1589 
77 
 
1694 
89 
 
1745 
107 
 
1798 
122 
 
2,089 
123 
 
1,774 
196 
 
1,437 
170 
 
1,004 
N/A 
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Cellular 
ENTEL movil(2) 
Total employment 
Suscribers/employee 
    
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
225 
N/A 
Telecel 
Total employment 
Suscribers/employee 
 
78 
34 
 
88 
46 
 
152 
48 
 
155 
121 
 
223 
190 
 
247 
516 
 
258 
N/A 
 
298 
N/A 
Local 
COTEL (La Paz) 
Total employment 
Suscribers/employee 
 
868 
85 
 
932 
94 
 
976 
100 
 
967 
127 
 
932 
134 
 
905 
164 
 
904 
176 
 
670 
N/A 
COTAS (Santa Cruz) 
Total employment 
Suscribers/employee 
 
616 
94 
 
612 
107 
 
606 
121 
 
601 
140 
 
622 
164 
 
652 
184 
 
615 
212 
 
599 
N/A 
COMTECO (Cochabamba) 
Total employment 
Suscribers/employee 
 
351 
88 
 
427 
88 
 
449 
102 
 
490 
116 
 
542 
138 
 
578 
160 
 
378 
283 
 
368 
N/A 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
(1) For ENTEL, the data from 1997 on include cellular phone service provided through ENTEL-Movil.  (2) Information 
on subscribers, but not on employment, is available for 1996-98.  ENTEL-Movil began operations at the end of 1996. 
 
In ENTEL, employment peaked in 1997.  ENTEL-Movil initiated its operations in 
1996 and possibly completed hiring in 1997, which may account for the increase in the 
number of workers between 1996 and 1997.  In the subsequent years, one observes a 
continuous decline at relatively large and increasing annual rates, 15 percent in 1998, and 
19 and 30 percent in 1999 and 2000, respectively.  Labor productivity, as measured by 
long distance minutes per employee continued to grow until 1998, but a decline is visible 
in 1999 despite falling employment levels.  This reflects weakening demand for long 
distance services, induced by the recession and perhaps by growing internet use. 
In the case of cellular services, the data record is incomplete, but one might 
venture that the experience of Telecel reflects that of both operators.  Telecel increased its 
employment levels continuously up to 1996, but then reduced them in 1997, partially 
reacting to ENTEL-Movil’s entry and the onset of price competition.  Increases in labor 
productivity also display an upward trend during this period, reaching 152 percent by 
1996.  Telecel resumed its employment increases after 1997, and its personnel count in 
2000 was practically double that of 1996.  In spite of this, labor productivity continued to 
increase, by 57 percent in 1997 and 172 percent in 1998.  These positive results reflect 
expansion primarily due to price competition, but also to improvements in quality. 
 For local telephony, in all cases there is an important and consistent growth in 
labor productivity, reflecting increases in the number of connections.  Nevertheless, some 
operators reduced personnel in some years, such as COTEL in 1995, COTAS in 1993-96 
and 1998-99, and COMTECO during 1998-99. 
So far, we have reviewed the electricity and telecommunications sectors, 
concluding that employment peaked around 1997, so that one cannot rule out that 
capitalization might have caused some reductions in personnel.  The employment levels 
in these sectors are quite small, however – they account for less than six thousand jobs 
out of more than 1.3 million people working in the capital cities.  Nonetheless, the job 
losses in tables 8 and 9 can account for about 3 percent of the aggregate job losses in 
capital cities between 1995 and 2000, so the effect, while small, is not necessarily 
negligible. 
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3. Oil and gas 
 
We unfortunately do not have complete data for other sectors.  Due to the 
importance of the hydrocarbons sector, however, we cover part of it in table 10.  This 
information shows that YPFB did display employment decreases after the 1997 reforms, 
but it is important to distinguish between the upstream (exploration and production) and 
downstream (distribution) activities.  Before reform, the number of employees in the 
upstream sector fluctuated around 25 percent of the total.  These were substituted by the 
capitalized ANDINA and CHACO, which in 1998 operated with about 40 percent of the 
total personnel YPFB had in 1996.  The continuing decrease in employment for YPFB, 
even beyond 1999, happened as one by one all of the activities in the downstream sector 
were being privatized.   
 
Table 10 
Employment levels and mean labor productivity in the oil and gas sector 
 
Firm 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 
YPFB 
Number of employees 
     Upstream 
     Downstream 
BEP/total employees 
 
5,440 
1,530 
3,910 
3,258 
 
5,600 
1,205 
4,395 
3,374 
 
4,927 
1,191 
3,736 
4,190 
 
4,724 
1,227 
3,497 
4,278 
 
4,503 
1,160 
3,343 
4,284 
 
2,528 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
 
1,826 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
 
954 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
ANDINA 
Number of employees 
BEP day/ employee 
      
442 
89.7 
 
185 
285.0 
 
n/a 
n/a 
CHACO 
Number of employees 
BEP day/ employee 
      
264 
137.5 
 
298 
168.1 
 
n/a 
n/a 
TRANSREDES 
Number of employees 
      
384 
 
408 
 
n/a 
Source:  Based on Ayala (2000). 
 
Although the Table shows the number of employees in oil and gas transportation 
(represented by TRANREDES), there is no available information for the rest of the 
downstream activities (industrialization, storage, distribution and commercialization). 
Taken together, the evidence on employment levels suggests that capitalization 
was indeed associated with reductions in employment, amid increasing output and labor 
productivity.  If one puts these effects in the context of the broader Bolivian employment 
picture, however, there is (incomplete) evidence that the direct employment losses do not 
account for the majority of the unemployment increases that started in 1998.   
  
C. Profitability and flows of funds 
 
Financial results are of course another relevant outcome, and in this section we 
cover issues related to the performance of State and private firms in the industries of 
interest.  Table 11 presents descriptive statistics for the main State firms in the 1990-2001 
period.  One has to keep in mind that part of YPFB was capitalized in 1997, ENDE and 
ENTEL in 1995 and ENFE in 1996.  However, except for ENTEL and LAB, residuals of 
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these firms remained, with privatization of parts of them occurring at a later time.  If one 
looks at current expenditures over current revenues, up to their capitalization year, the 
data show that except for ENDE and ENFE in 199548, the firms considered did self-
finance its operation expenditures and were capable of making short term transfers to the 
State, although some, like ENDE and ENTEL were in a less constrained position.  When 
one considers total (which includes capital) expenditures over total revenues, however, in 
most cases the firms are in deficit, except for YPFB in 1995-97, ENDE in 1991 and 1993-
94, ENTEL in 1992 and 1994-95.  This suggests that most of the time State firms had to 
finance their investments through debt,49 and that in many years there were investment 
shortfalls.   
The size of these firms’ investment can be observed as a percentage of GDP, and 
in relation all50 State enterprise investment.  Additionally, the table describes the 
magnitude of taxes, royalties and net transfers to the government, also as a percentage of 
GDP.  In both of these areas, YPFB stands out.   
During the post-capitalization period, the picture for residual firms in terms of 
investment and contribution to government changes substantially, as one would expect.  
However, it is worrisome that the other indicators worsen dramatically suggesting 
continuing deficits, particularly for residual ENDE and ENFE. 
 
                                                 
48 ENDE was capitalized in 1995, so that its indicators for that year are not comparable with previous years. 
49 In general government firms could not obtain commercial credit, their debt was concessionary credits 
from bilateral or multilateral agencies with government guaranty. 
50 Infrastructure sectors, hydrocarbons, mineral and industrial. 
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Table 11 
Cash flow statistics for government firms, 1990-01 
 
Firms 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
YPFB 
C. Exp./C. Rev. 
T. Exp./T. Rev.  
I/GDP in % 
T/GDP in % 
 
0.90 
1.08 
2.17 
7.92 
 
0.89 
1.05 
2.16 
8.85 
 
0.90 
1.06 
1.86 
7.21 
 
0.95 
1.08 
1.65 
6.47 
 
0.90 
1.07 
1.67 
5.93 
 
0.88 
0.99 
0.98 
5.52 
 
0.90 
0.97 
0.63 
5.79 
 
0.95 
0.96 
0.10 
3.34 
 
1.05 
1.06 
0.05 
3.41 
 
0.97 
0.98 
0.08 
3.09 
 
0.95 
0.95 
0.00 
-0.18 
 
0.97 
0.97 
0.01 
-0.30 
ENDE 
C. Exp./C. Rev. 
T. Exp./T. Rev.  
I/GDP in % 
T/GDP in % 
 
0.65 
0.94 
0.32 
0.06 
 
0.63 
1.14 
0.55 
0.07 
 
0.63 
1.43 
1.01 
0.02 
 
0.58 
0.95 
0.53 
0.15 
 
0.62 
0.82 
0.33 
0.19 
 
1.31 
1.16 
0.52 
0.73 
 
0.87 
1.64 
0.32 
0.16 
 
0.55 
0.82 
0.09 
0.04 
 
1.12 
1.35 
0.03 
0.00 
 
1.02 
0.69 
0.01 
-0.02 
 
2.05 
1.39 
0.00 
0.00 
 
2.15 
1.54 
0.01 
-0.01 
ENTEL 
C. Exp./C. Rev. 
T. Exp./T. Rev.  
I/GDP in % 
T/GDP in % 
 
0.72 
1.23 
0.57 
0.41 
 
0.70 
1.04 
0.40 
0.49 
 
0.72 
0.89 
0.24 
0.44 
 
0.84 
1.15 
0.45 
0.63 
 
0.88 
0.98 
0.14 
0.80 
 
0.87 
0.93 
0.09 
0.71 
      
ENFE 
C. Exp./C. Rev. 
T. Exp./T. Rev.  
I/GDP in % 
T/GDP in % 
 
0.97 
1.44 
0.39 
0.06 
 
0.84 
1.05 
0.28 
-0.10 
 
0.77 
1.07 
0.32 
0.12 
 
0.95 
1.12 
0.24 
-0.09 
 
0.88 
1.05 
0.18 
0.07 
 
1.03 
1.11 
0.09 
0.06 
 
0.97 
0.86 
0.00 
-0.20 
 
2.68 
1.33 
0.01 
-0.02 
 
2.33 
1.39 
0.00 
-0.01 
 
6.91 
1.42 
0.00 
0.00 
 
1.88 
1.33 
0.00 
0.00 
 
4.26 
1.49 
0.00 
0.00 
ALL 
I/GDP in % 
T/GDP in % 
 
3.87 
8.65 
 
3.75 
9.50 
 
4.08 
8.00 
 
3.29 
7.44 
 
2.63 
6.57 
 
2.15 
7.75 
 
1.69 
6.14 
 
0.66 
3.46 
 
0.33 
3.34 
 
0.22 
3.13 
 
0.17 
-0.22 
 
0.17 
-0.33 
Note:  C. Exp. = Current expenditures including current transfers; C. Rev = Current revenues including current transfers and 
operational revenues; T. Exp. = Total expenditures including current and capital expenditures; T. Rev. = Total revenues including 
current and capital revenues; I = Investment; T = Taxes, royalties and net transfers to government. 
Source:  Unidad de Programación Fiscal. 
 
Moving on to private firms and to the 1997-2000 period, for each sector table 12 
presents:  i) operational costs over revenues – a rough measure of internal efficiency, and 
ii) the net profit over equity.  In electricity generation, Corani and COBEE show better 
performances than Guaracachi and Valle Hermoso under both of these criteria.  Recall 
that the first two are hydroelectric and the latter two are thermoelectric.  In electricity 
distribution, the year 2000 shows ELECTROPAZ with the lowest expenditure over 
revenue relationship and the highest return on equity, followed by ELFEC and ELFEO 
overtime.  The remaining firms are cooperatives (CRE) or have municipal participation. 
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Table 12 
Performance indicators of main firms in regulated sectors 
 
Operational costs / Op. revenues After tax profit / Equity Sector/Company 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Electricity generation           
CORANI 0.38 0.40 0.38 0.48 0.6 12.2 7.2 9.3 8.0 5.2 
VALLE HERMOSO 1.02 0.90 1.02 1.01 2.5 2.6 4.8 4.7 3.7 -0.9 
GUARACACHI 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.82 0.8 3.6 5.6 4.4 5.3 2.7 
COBEE 0.65 0.69 0.59 0.63 0.5 11.1 7.2 11.6 9.8 14.3 
TDE-Transmission   0.66 0.65 0.65   5.2 6.2 6.6 
Electricity distribution           
ELECTROPAZ 0.81 0.78 0.77 0.84 0.86 11.1 10.9 14.2 14.4 6.9 
CRE 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.93 0.94 6.0 6.8 3.0 2.8 2.3 
ELFEC 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.92 0.95 10.1 9.1 10.3 14.2 7.2 
CESSA 0.93 0.90 0.77 0.97 0.97 4.6 8.4 0.6 7.5 5.7 
SEPSA 0.98 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.94 6.8 6.5 6.3 4.4 4.2 
ELFEO 0.81 0.77 0.82 0.91 0.87 12.4 16.9 12.4 8.2 4.6 
Oil and gas           
Andina(1)  0.92 0.91 0.75 0.00  0.7 1.3 6.1 0.0 
Chaco(1)  0.76 0.54 0.38 0.37  -2.1 6.1 9.6 8.5 
Transredes(2) 0.58(3) 0.57 0.61 1.60 0.87 7.3 6.0 8.3   -4.0 2.5 
Telecommunications           
ENTEL 0.80 0.83 0.94   6.2 8.9 5.3   
TELECEL 0.95 0.84 N/d   -24.3 33.4 N/A   
COTEL 1.32 1.29 1.30   -30.5 -9.4 -11.0   
COTAS 0.89 0.89 0.88   1.7 0.5 0.6   
COMTECO 0.85 0.73 0.98   3.3 5.2 2.8   
Airlines and airports           
LAB 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.03  2.5 -5.8 0.4 -14.0  
AEROSUR 1.18 0.98 1.04 0.83  -19.3 1.6 -9.4 0.0  
SABSA 0.93 0.97 1.10 1.16  33.3 12.0 -15.7 -83.9  
Rail transportation           
FCA 0.85 0.85 0.93 0.86  13.6 7.3 8.7 8.2  
FCO 0.57 0.59 0.71 0.68  27.0 28.5 15.5 15.2  
Water           
Aguas del Illimani 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.64 0.65 0.9 15.0 18.4 4.9 -4.9 
Source:  General Superintendence. 
(1) For years ending in March.  (2) Includes revenues from the deferred account.  (3) Corresponds to seven months of operations. 
 
For oil and gas we only have information on Chaco, Andina, and Transredes.  In 
the upstream both Chaco and Andina have increasingly improved their internal efficiency 
and return on equity over the years.  Transredes, the main firm in pipeline transportation, 
has managed to generate annual surpluses, except for the year 2000 when it incurred a 
capital loss due to an oil spill. 
Moving on to telecommunications, the data shows that internal efficiency in 
ENTEL and COMTECO deteriorated in 1999 relative to previous years.  This result has 
determined a drop in our measure of profitability from 8.9 to 5.3 percent, and from 5.2 to 
2.8 percent respectively.  For COTAS and COTEL the efficiency indicator has remained 
stable, but COTEL has generated loses every year, compared to weak profits for COTAS.  
Further, TELECEL improved its internal efficiency between 1997-98 (there is no 
available information for 1999). 
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In the transportation sector, the data show that LAB managed to break even in 
1999, but incurred significant losses by 2000.  The company that capitalized it, VASP, 
under pressures in its home market, exited the firm in 2002, and LAB was taken over by 
Bolivian investors. AEROSUR, which participated in the domestic market only, produced 
a profit on only one of the years considered.  SABSA, the airport terminal operator, has 
experienced deteriorating performance since 1997, when it had a positive margin, to 
2000, when it experienced a dramatic loss. 
For the years covered, rail transport presents a more positive picture.  FCA made a 
13.6 percent return on equity in 1997, although by 2000 this fell to 8.2 percent.  For FCO, 
the 1997-98 profit rate fluctuated around 28 percent, and fell to 15 percent by 1999-2000.  
Nonetheless, it has been identified as the most profitable firm among the capitalized 
firms. 
Finally, the table also presents performance indicators for Aguas del Illimani, the 
only privately administrated firm in the water industry.  The indicators show a constant 
tendency toward improvement during the 1997-99 period, however, the numbers drop 
significantly in 2000. 
 
VI. Effects:  access and prices    
 
 As the previous sections make clear, capitalization and privatization had many of 
their key effects on the utilities sector.  As such, some of their central social effects 
concern how they influenced households’ access to basic services, and the prices at which 
they obtain them.   
 
A. Access 
 
Using household surveys described in appendix A, one is able to arrive at a 
relatively consistent picture of what happened to access in electricity, water, and phone 
services during the 1990’s.  Tables 1, 2 and 3 in Appendix B describe the questions and 
possible answers used to construct different definitions of access. 
Using these definitions, table 13 describes the basic evolution of access to these 
three services in the department capitals of Bolivia.  In general, these experienced little 
change between 1989 and 1994 (the pre-Capitalization period), and some improvement 
thereafter, particularly in telephone access.  The exception to this comes with the second 
definition for water, which experiences a substantial decline between 1989 and 1994.  
This may be partially due to changes in the exact phrasing of questions between surveys. 
Nevertheless, because these access rates refer to the departmental capitals only, it 
is not necessarily surprising that they decline in certain periods – Bolivia is still 
experiencing substantial rural to urban migration, so that in the absence of significant 
investment, access rates can fall due to (urban) population growth. 
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Table 13 
Access to electricity,  water, and telephone services in the department capitals of Bolivia 
 
Service / definition 1989 1994 1999 
Electricity 1 0.921 0.960 0.988 
Water 1 0.769 0.807 0.921 
Water 2 0.543 0.267 0.421 
Telephone 1 -- 0.206 0.425 
Telephone 2 0.206 -- 0.412 
Telephone 3 -- 0.258 0.311 
 
1. Changes in connection rates 
 
Focusing on connection rates, this section considers only access to electricity, 
telephone, water, and sewerage services.  We ignore gas for two reasons.  First, in most 
cities, gas for domestic consumption is distributed in bottled form.  Thus, its use does not 
imply connection to a network, but rather reflects households’ potentially temporary 
decision to use this fuel.  Secondly, even where network distribution is available, its 
coverage is too small to be reliably captured using household surveys.  With this caveat, 
table 14 illustrates the aggregate facts on the evolution of connection to basic services.   
 
Table 14 
Departmental capitals and El Alto: 
Percentage of households connected to basic services, 1994-1999 
 
Percentage of households with access Service 
1994 
(a) 
1999 
(b) 
% change 
 
Electricity 95.8 98.4 2.7 
Telephone 20.0 44.6 123.0 
Water 80.7 92.8 15.0 
Sewerage 62.6 70.9 13.3 
                             Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
As might be expected in light of the investment record, basic access increased for 
all services considered.  Furthermore, for those with initially lower coverage, sewerage, 
water, and particularly telephone, the increases have been significant.   
 
2. Causality:  are these changes actually due to capitalization? 
 
While table 14 suggests that the reforms have been associated with an expansion 
in access, it does not necessarily imply that these caused this phenomenon.  Indeed, other 
factors such as income growth or technological change might have resulted in higher 
connection rates even in the absence of any liberalization. 
In a strict sense, it is impossible to isolate the effects these measures had, since no 
counterfactual is available to assess what would have happened had none of them been in 
place.  If this information were available, a simple comparison would reveal the effects of 
the reform “treatment”; in its absence, simple conclusions are not feasible.  Nonetheless, 
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one can attempt to circumvent this problem by comparing treatment and control sectors 
or periods.  This section presents two exercises that attempt this. 
A first possibility is to observe the changes in access prior to the reform period, 
comparing them to those that occurred thereafter.  To implement this, figure 2 displays 
access rates for 1989, 1994, and 1999 for each of the sectors considered.51  In this case, 
the 1989-94 period serves as a control for the 1994-99 capitalization years.  This 
comparison is enhanced because as relatively low inflation, moderate growth, and 
political stability prevailed during both periods. 
Figure 2
Department capitals:  percentage of households with 
access to basic services, 1989-1999
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 This simple evidence is generally suggestive of a positive effect for sewerage, 
telephone, and water services.  The access rates in these sectors were either constant or 
decreasing between 1989 and 1994, but display significant increases after this last year.  
In the case of electricity, in contrast, the entire 1989-99 period suggests gradual growth in 
access, with no particular acceleration taking place during the second phase.  In fact, 
figure 2 may actually underestimate a capitalization effect.  This is because while the 
legal reforms underpinning capitalization began to take effect in 1994 and 1995, the 
actual investments, depending on the specific sector, did not start until 1996, 1997, or 
even 1998. 
In the case of telephone service, these conclusions are also observed using 
conventional penetration data, as presented in figure 3.  This further allows a distinction 
between fixed line, cellular and internet connections, which is not possible with the 
household survey data.  This figure also displays stagnant performance early on, with 
                                                 
51 The 1989 survey does not contain a direct question on telephone access, so households were considered 
connected when they declared positive expenditures on telephone service.  Using the same approach in 
subsequent years does not qualitatively affect the conclusions that flow from Figure 1. 
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growth starting in 1996.  From this year, mobile telephone coverage has increased 
rapidly, and although fixed connections have been less dynamic, the overall penetration 
rate essentially tripled in four years.   
 
Figure 3:  Penetration rates by technology 
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        Source:  Telecommunications Superintendence. 
 
 Just as it is important to consider the timing of these reforms, it is key to bear in 
mind that in each sector, the effects observed cannot be attributed only to capitalization.  
As described in section II, the relevant changes include the implementation of regulation 
in all these sectors, but also other liberalizations like the introduction of competition in 
cellular, and concessions in the case of water and sewerage.   
Another way to attempt to isolate these reforms’ impact is to compare cities in 
which they would be expected to have more consequences with those in which they 
might have had less of an effect.  In the case of water and sewerage services, La Paz/El 
Alto was the only city with a sustained concession. Figure 4 presents the evidence on this 
case, where the expectation would be that increases in access would be larger in these 
than in other urban centers. 
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Figure 4
Water and sewerage:  evolution of access rates in La Paz / El Alto and 
other urban areas, 1989-1999
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 For water, there appears to be little difference between the evolution of La Paz / 
El Alto and other cities.  If anything, coverage in these areas appears to have converged 
over this period.  In the case of sewerage, there are significant distinctions, but these 
seem to arise mainly from performance that took place before 1994, when coverage rose 
in La Paz / El Alto but declined in all other major urban areas. In short, the evidence in 
this sectors is inconclusive, but does not seem to suggest a strong capitalization / 
privatization effect.  In the cases of electricity and telephone services, the distinction 
between the treatment and control urban centers is also not always clear, and is omitted 
here for reasons of space. 
In the end, none of these comparisons is conclusive, but taken together and 
combined with the investment levels cited, they lend support to the perception that the 
capitalization processes did contribute to an expansion of investment in infrastructure and 
access to basic services in Bolivia. 
It is nonetheless relevant to note that the information presented gives a relatively 
optimistic picture of connection rates in Bolivia.  To a large extent, this reflects that due 
to data limitations, the analysis concentrates only on department capitals.52  This 
overstates national welfare levels because other urban areas, and the rural area in general, 
display lower connection rates.  This is illustrated in figure 5, which shows access rates in 
departmental capitals, other urban areas, and rural locations. The significant differences 
between areas reflect substantial variation in income levels and population densities.  
 
                                                 
52 It is also possible that household could be overstating their welfare in this dimension.  As long as such 
misrepresentation is consistent from period to period, however, it should not affect any conclusions based 
on the trends. 
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Over the years, there has also been an effort to extend telephone coverage to the 
rural area, and in fact the capitalization contract with ENTEL contained clauses in this 
regard.  Table 15 shows some rural penetration data for telephone services, indicating the 
proportion of towns of various sizes that have some sort of service.  As would be 
expected, this proportion increases rapidly with population.  While the number of 
connections actually implicit in these numbers is naturally quite low, they can have 
substantial welfare impacts for the rural population. 
 
 
Table 15:  Telephone penetration in rural areas, 1999 
 
 Population 
Range Number of towns Inhabitants 
Towns with 
telephone services
Proportion of towns with 
telephone service 
Less then 200 hab. 5,296 647,072 11 0.2% 
201  - 350 3,392 897,000 47 1.4% 
351 – 1000 2,331 1,204,654 815 35.0% 
1001 – 2000 276 379,261 134 48.6% 
2001 – 5000 99 290,085 42 42.4% 
5001 – 7500 15 88,212 10 66.7% 
7501 – 10000 8 69,999 7 87.5% 
Total 11,417 3,576,282 1,066 9.3% 
Source:  Telecommunications Superintendence. 
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3. Did the expansion in access bypass or benefit the poor? 
 
The aggregate changes reviewed thus far are consistent with a number of 
scenarios as to the distribution of the gains depicted.  Specifically, they are not 
informative as to how lower income or poor households have fared.  As stated, the 
capitalization reforms mainly affected the department capitals.  Because a majority of 
Bolivia’s poor live in rural areas, these reforms in some sense bypassed this population. 
Ajwad and Wodon (2000) make this point indirectly by studying to what extent 
poor municipalities (out of a total of about 300) benefit from expansions in education, 
health or infrastructure services.  They conclude that in sewerage, electricity, and phone 
connections, the non-poor benefit more, water being the only exception.  In short, if the 
entire capitalization process did lead to some increase in access rates, it is unlikely to 
have been particularly beneficial to the poor, at least from a national perspective. 
Nevertheless, it is still relevant to explore whether access expansions bypassed the 
urban poor, since that would seem the real, and perhaps more reasonable, test as to the 
equity side of the capitalization process.  Furthermore, the low coverage rates in the rural 
areas reflect inequity but also economic rationality:  providing these services can be 
extremely expensive when population density is below some threshold level.  To this end, 
the following figures compare how households have fared according to the (department 
capital) income quintiles to which they belong.   
Figure 6
Department capitals:  Percentage of households with access to electricity, 
by income quantile: 1989-1999
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Figure 6 starts with the case of electricity, which has been the sector with the 
smallest improvements in access, partially reflecting favorable initial conditions.  The 
figure displays a clear convergence:  the quintiles with the lowest access levels in 1989 
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have been those with the greatest increases during 1989-99, an observation which also 
holds for 1994-99.  While in 1989 households in the lowest quintile had an access rate of 
only 86 percent, by 1994 all five had rates exceeding 95 percent.  It is surprising that by 
1999 the lowest income group seems in fact to have surpassed all but the richest.  In part, 
this may reflect sampling issues, since when all groups have high and similar access 
rates, these differences cease to be statistically significant. 
Taking a similar approach, figure 7 reviews the experience with telephone access.  
The evolution here has been somewhat different from that observed in the case of 
electricity.  As reviewed earlier, between 1989 and 1994 (the pre-capitalization period) 
access rates were essentially flat.  Figure 7 reveals that this aggregate behavior in fact 
hides an increase in access for the highest income quintiles, and declines in connection 
for the lower income households, where once again, this could reflect that many rural 
migrants enter the cities at the bottom of the income distribution. 
Figure 7
Department capitals:  percentage of households that have access to telephone 
services, by income quintile: 1989-1999
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Figure 7 also shows, however, that these trends changed significantly after 
capitalization.  Namely, between 1994 and 1999 access rates increased for all income 
groups.  The relative gap between the two or three bottom quintiles and the richest has 
decreased significantly, even if the absolute difference in percentage points has remained 
fairly constant.  In short, this simple evidence suggests that in the case of telephone 
access, liberalization has not merely included the poor, but may have actually reversed 
trends that were detrimental to them. 
Moving onto the case of water, figure 8 shows an evolution not unlike that 
displayed by telephone services. Once again, access rates are relatively stable in the 
control period, but increase between 1994 and 1999.  The convergence in connection 
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rates is more marked:  by 1999 households in all quintiles have access rates above 90 
percent, and the differences between them are often not statistically significant.53 
Figure 8
Departmental capitals:  percentage of households with access to water services 
by income quintile:  1989-1999
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 Finally, figure 9 shows the evolution of access to sewerage.  In this case the 
information is less consistent.  A surprising observation is that in fact all surveys suggest 
that the situation of the lowest income quintile is better than that displayed by at least 
quintiles 2-4, in some sense the middle class.  This may reflect measurement problems, as 
it is also reported in The World Bank (2000). 
                                                 
53 It might seem surprising that access rates are not closer to 100 percent for the top quintiles.  While this 
may reflect data problems, there are “good” reasons for it.  In the largest cities, for instance, high-income 
developments are sometimes built outside the reach of water networks.  These households use truck-
delivered water, and despite having all the standard facilities, will not be counted as connected. 
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Figure 9
Departmental capitals:  percentage of households with access to sewerage 
by income quintiles:  1989-1999
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To summarize, despite data limitations, the household survey data suggests that 
the capitalization/regulation reforms, to the extent that they caused increases in 
connection rates, have not bypassed poor households, and have in some cases tended to 
benefit them disproportionately.  This has been particularly the case for phone services, 
where competition has helped to reverse trends of increasing inequality.   
 
B. Prices 
 
There are a number of reasons to believe that prices may increase following 
privatization.  These include: 
 
1) Average tariff levels can increase due to cost recovery requirements and the need to 
finance quality improvements.  This section shows that while average prices increased in 
some sectors, changes were generally not dramatic.  In part, this reflects that because 
capitalization was not a means to raise deficit finance, there were fewer incentives for the 
State to build high tariffs into privatization.  The concurrent implementation of a 
regulatory framework, and the promotion of competition may have also helped to keep 
price increases in check. 
 
2) Tariff structures may be readjusted as direct or cross-subsidies disappear, either as an 
explicit policy or as a consequence of market forces.  Although the data below suggest 
some rebalancing did take place, there are reasons to believe that in Bolivia, the 
incentives to rebalance were not as strong.  First, some firms affected by the reforms 
were private already (e.g. COBEE in electricity).  Second, where they were not private, 
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utilities often functioned as cooperatives, which may not have the same distributional 
goals as typical State enterprises.  Finally, the vertical separation that some industries 
displayed before privatization may have meant that cross subsidies were less prevalent 
than in other countries.  For instance, it is not uncommon for high long distance rates to 
subsidize low local charges.  In Bolivia, the long distance state provider, ENTEL, was 
always separate from the local cooperatives 
 
3) As the industry becomes more formal, revenue collection and discouragement of 
illegal connections are likely to result in price increases.  Once again, the existence of 
private firms or cooperatives may have meant that there was not as much room for 
improvement in this regard, although the nature of our data does not allow us to observe 
informal connections. 
 
4) Privatization may affect the availability and prices of substitutes or complements. 
 
Making an effort to deal with significant data limitations, this section looks at 
these issues in the case of electricity, water, and telephone services. 
 
1. Electricity 
 
 Figure 10 presents the evolution of minimum electricity tariffs, up to 20 
Kwh/month, in the three largest cities (for completeness, it includes data from 1992, 
while the reforms commenced in 1994/95).  These are not average tariffs, but rather those 
most likely to be most relevant for low-income households.  As evident, rates in 
Cochabamba have decreased by about 14 percent since capitalization.  In contrast, prices 
have gone up by 15 percent in Santa Cruz, and by roughly 7 in La Paz/El Alto. 
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Figure 10
Tariffs for 0 - 20 Kwh in the central axis cities, 1992-1999
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Regarding rebalancing, distribution is still carried out by local monopolies that 
may experience fewer pressures to engage in this behavior.  To explore this issue and 
provide further evidence on average prices, table 16 shows the mean tariffs in cents per 
Kwh for the three largest distributors, distinguishing according to the type of customer.  
As the table shows, both the pre and post-capitalization periods have been characterized 
by overall real price increases for the residential sector.  Nevertheless, this trend seems to 
be reversing, with price decreases (or zero increases) visible in Cochabamba and Santa 
Cruz by 1998, a behavior consistent with that displayed by minimum prices in figure 10. 
 
Table 16 
Residential rates for electric distributors in La Paz / El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz 
 
Tariff rates Percentage change in the 
residential sector 
Percentage change in all 
sectors 
Year 
Electropaz 
(La Paz / El 
Alto) 
Elfec 
(Cbba.) 
CRE 
(Santa 
Cruz) 
Electropaz Elfec CRE Electropaz Elfec CRE 
1992 3.96 5.62 4.45 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
1993 4.30 5.52 4.47 8.6 -1.8 0.0 9.8 -0.6 1.4 
1994 4.60 5.66 4.56 7.0 2.5 2.0 5.3 1.2 1.8 
1995 4.89 6.04 4.86 6.3 6.7 6.6 5.2 5.4 5.9 
1996 5.04 6.25 5.45 4.2 3.5 12.1 2.9 1.9 6.8 
1997 5.34 6.31 5.71 5.9 0.9 4.8 6.3 2.6 4.4 
1998 5.74 6.65 5.71 7.5 5.4 0.0 7.4 3.4 -0.4 
1999 6.08 6.45 5.52 5.9 -3.0 -3.3 5.4 -1.6 -1.9 
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The last six columns explore the issue of rebalancing.  Although the classification 
of customers varies between cities, the data suggest the residential sector has seen greater 
increases, but the differences do not always go in this direction and generally do not seem 
that large. 
 
2. Telephone services 
 
Coverage expansions have been greatest in the case of telephones, so one might 
expect significant price reductions in this case. These partially reflect technological 
innovation and the effects of competition, which as in other countries seems to have 
allowed privatization to create rather than destroy service alternatives.  In Bolivia, this 
happened because prior to reform Telecel had a (private) monopoly in cellular services, 
and there is evidence that it priced accordingly.   
Figures 11 and 12 show the dollar price for the standard service offered from the 
early 1990’s to October 1996.  The fixed monthly tariff of 29.9 dollars did not include 
free minutes, and the tariff per minute was 0.41, covering both incoming and outgoing 
calls.  Additionally, Telecel charged 417 dollars for the initial connection.  The entrance 
of capitalized ENTEL’s subsidiary, ENTEL-Movil, permitted the reductions observed.  
Competition was so effective that although the regulator set a price cap of $US 180 for 
access and $US 51 for use, both firms began charging average rates that were roughly 
five percent of this level. 
 
Figure 11
Minimum fixed monthly tariff with no free minutes in cellular 
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Figures 11 and 12 are based on ENTEL’s  “Family Plan” and Telecel’s “Economy 
Plan”.  Under these, connection fees for digital lines are free, the monthly fixed tariff 
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without free minutes dropped to 1.93 dollars in November 1996, and the tariff per minute 
increased to 0.45.  While in the first period tariffs were set in dollars, in the second they 
were set in bolivianos, becoming subject to depreciation.  By December 1999, the dollar 
value of the fixed tariff dropped to 1.67 and the per-minute tariff dropped to 0.39.  
Simultaneously, both ENTEL and Telecel introduced a variety of other plans and 
prepayment mechanisms, with the latter contributing to further penetration. 
 
Figure 12
Minimum tariff per minute in cellular 
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These reductions, combined with the availability of low cost cellular phones 
dramatically lowered access prices, particularly compared to the historical performance 
of the local telephone cooperatives, which charge fees in excess of 1,000 dollars for a 
fixed connection/share.  As a new operator entered the market at the end of 2000, and as 
all these markets where liberalized in 2001, these trends are expected to continue. 
 
3. Water 
 
As stated, in the case of water privatization was really a concession, and only 
affected La Paz/El Alto.  Up to 1996, the state-owned SAMAPA operated with a 
complicated tariff structure that contained more than 150 categories, 15 for metered 
customers and 135 for the rest.  Under this arrangement, consumers were not charged for 
the first 10m3, and the mean tariff was approximately $US 0.32/m3. 
 In December of 1996, the National Council of Tariffs voted to amend and 
simplify this arrangement.  This policy was intended to become effective on December 
1996, but in practice was implemented by Aguas del Illimani in May, 1997, along with a 
19 percent increase it was granted upon taking over.  The prevailing tariff structure is 
displayed in table 17. 
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Table 17 
Tariff structures for SAMAPA and Aguas del Illimani 
 
Type of consumer (m3 / month) Tariff ($US/m3) 
Domestic Commercial Industrial SAMAPA Aguas del 
Illimani 
Percentage 
change 
1 to 30   0.1850 0.2214 19.7 
31 to 150   0.3719 0.4428 19.1 
151 to 300 1 to 20  0.5579 0.6642 19.0 
301 or more 21 or more 1 or more 0.9964 1.1862 19.0 
 
While this arrangement is relatively progressive, clearly the customers that 
benefited from the “free” 10m3 would have been hurt.  Nevertheless, cross subsidies 
persist, and while the concession did result in higher prices, the increases are smaller than 
those in Santa Cruz, where no such reform took place.  This is illustrated in figure 13.54 
 
Figure 13
Water tariffs for 10 m3 in the central axis cities, 1992-
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54 Cochabamba actually experienced a decline in real tariffs during the reform period, a development not 
unrelated to the fact that concession was a failure in this city. 
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C. Consumption distribution  
 
The household surveys also provide expenditure data for the three services 
considered.  The most important drawback with these is that they do not include the 
quantities of different types of services consumed.  This issue is most severe in the case 
of telephone services, where it is impossible to distinguish the type of phone service 
(cellular or fixed line) paid for.  Even in the cases of electricity and water, however, there 
are limitations, since one cannot easily determine what prices each house paid. 
 With this caveat, Figure 14 presents expenditure Lorenz curves for each of these 
three services.  This data shows that: i) in general, expenditure is most unequally 
distributed for telephone services, followed by water and electricity, and ii) within each 
service, the spending distribution has become more equitable over the last 10 years.  This 
is particularly so in the case of telephone services.  The major reason for this is the 
improvement in access, with which many households go from having zero to positive, 
albeit relatively small, expenditures.   
 
Expenditure Lorenz curves for 1989 and 1999
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D. Effects on welfare 
 
In the end, the effects of privatization on households’ welfare depend on how the 
positive effects of improvements in access balance against the negative consequences of 
price increases.  Calculating these is methodologically demanding, and a series of 
assumptions must be made, especially in light of the lack of data. As part of a separate 
research project (see Mookherjee and Mckenzie, 2000, for which we provided 
calculations) we made an attempt to measure these effects.  We do not include a full 
description of the methodology here for reasons of space. 
In the case of electricity we find that even though prices rose, the overall effect on 
welfare was positive for all except the top income decile.  For phone services we also 
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found positive effects, although these tended to be greatest among the middle deciles 
where access improvements were greatest.  In water, we find that the concession in La 
Paz had positive net effects on welfare, particularly among lower deciles that experienced 
the largest improvements in access.  Due the significant price increases that led to the 
failure to the concession in Cochabamba, there we find negative effects across the board. 
 
E. Service quality 
  
Aside from access and prices, consumers of course care about service quality.  
Here again there are data limitations, but we review the existing evidence for selected 
sectors.  The Electricity Law (1994) introduced regulation as regards the quality of 
distribution55 establishing four stages for its implementation.  In a first stage (January 
1996 to October 1997), the distribution firms helped establish the methodology for 
measurement and control of the quality indicators.  In the second, trial period (November 
1997 to April 1998), the distributor tested the methodology, and in the third, transition 
period (November 1997 to April 1998), the firms had to comply with the quality 
indicators established in the rules, subject to monetary penalties.  In the fourth stage (May 
2001 on), the distribution firm must comply with more demanding levels of the quality 
indicators established in the rules, with similar financial penalties for non-compliance. 
 Table 18 presents the admissible limits for the distribution quality indicators 
established in the rules.  It also presents the results reached by the six distribution 
enterprises that are part of the NIS.  The indicators are divided into three groups: 
commercial, technical, and product quality.  The data are simple averages from two 
periods, November 1988 -- April 1999, and May 1999 -- October 1999.  Unfortunately, 
these data were not collected pre-privatization.   
                                                 
55 Rules for the Quality of Distribution (1995). 
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Table 18 
Distribution quality indicators in the transition stage, 1999(1) 
 
Quality measure Limit 
allowed 
CRE ELECTRO-
PAZ 
ELFEC ELFEO CESSA SEPSA
Commercial service quality 
Index of technical complaints 
among users 
10 6.2 2.8 1.1 1.4 3.6 - 
Index of commercial complaints 
among users 
12 2.5 1.7 0.3 1.2 0.0 - 
Index of billing quality 30 1.8 4.9 1.1 5.1 0.7 - 
Index of estimated billing 25 5.4 16.4 15.6 20.0 58.5 - 
Average response time -- users’ 
technical complaints (hours) 
3 hours 2.7 2.3 3.8 1.4 1.1 - 
Average response time -- users’ 
commercial complaints (hours) 
48 hours 35.3 35.7 5.5 0.0 0.7 - 
Technical service quality 
Average interruption frecuency 
per user 
25 y 35(2) 5.9 3.5 3.4 3.2 7.5 4.5 
Total interruption time per user 
(hours) 
20 y 35(2) 6.9 4.2 3.1 3.6 7.0 3.3 
Technical quality (percentage of  cases analyzed by penalty)(3) 
Phase disequilibrium 22.4 3.3 5.3 5.6 - 8.3 
High voltage supply 0.0 0.0 25.0 20.8 - 0.0 
Medium voltage supply 5.5 6.4 32.5 11.1 61.1 55.9 
Centers in medium and low tension 26.1 2.9 30.3 15.5 66.7 70.8 
Low tension supply 28.1 6.7 62.3 25.0 75.0 56.3 
Fuente:  Memoria 1999, Superintendencia de Electricidad. 
 
 As this table shows, all the distribution enterprises are complying with almost all 
the commercial and technical quality indicators, the exceptions being CESSA for the 
index of estimated billing, and ELFEC for the average time to respond to technical 
complaints.  Regarding the quality of technical production, practically all firms present 
cases of non-compliance and in the cases of CESSA and SEPSA, these seem rather high. 
 All this information can do is establish that the electricity sector has seen recent 
efforts to improve quality.  We do not know if these levels are better than those one 
would have observed pre-privatization, especially since the firms themselves appear to 
have helped to draft the quality guidelines under which they now operate.  For what it is 
worth, anecdotal evidence indicates that distribution problems, particularly blackouts 
(which may have their ultimate genesis in the generation sector), are down since 
capitalization, and that overall consumers are more satisfied. 
 In the case of telecommunications, Table 19 presents a summary of the goals for 
expansion, quality, and modernization, and the degree of fulfillment by operators in long 
distance, local, and cellular services.  In each case we chose only the most relevant goals, 
which are summarized by the percentages accumulated for each year.  Fulfillment is 
verified comparing the accumulated percentages, where these must be larger than or 
equal to the goals (the opposite case for the incidence of faults).  ENTEL shows full 
compliance up to 1998.   
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Table 19 
Performance in expansion, quality and modernization (as a cummulative percentage for each year) 
 
1997 1998 1999 SECTORS, firms, and goals 
Goal Real Goal Real Goal Real 
LONG DISTANCE        
Entel -- Expansion in the extended rural area 
Number of towns connected 
 
25 
 
32.66 
 
50 
 
50.86 
 
75 
 
nd 
Entel -- Quality targets 
Corrección de fallas en 3 días, Area Extendida 
Rural 
National long distance calls complete 
International long distance calls complete 
 
85 
60 
55 
 
88 
62 
69 
 
90 
65 
60 
 
94 
67.5 
67 
 
95 
70 
65 
 
nd 
nd 
nd 
FIXED LINE        
Cotel -- Expansion goals 
Requests satisfied w/in time limits 
Modernization goals 
Digitalization 
Metas de calidad 
Incidence of faults(2) 
Correction of faults(3) 
Completed local calls 
Completed long distance calls 
 
12,000
 
5 
 
60 
40 
50 
50 
 
100 
 
5 
 
27 
55.3 
58 
78 
 
75 
 
30 
 
50 
60 
65 
60 
 
79 
 
51 
 
38 
64 
84 
84 
 
85 
 
60 
 
40 
80 
70 
67 
 
88 
 
71 
 
32 
71 
82 
65 
Cotas -- Expansion goals 
Requests satisfied w/in time limits 
Modernization goals 
Digitalization 
Metas de calidad 
Incidence of faults(2) 
Correction of faults(3) 
Completed local calls 
Completed long distance calls 
 
80 
 
80 
 
40 
55 
60 
55 
 
98.4 
 
96 
 
8 
67.9 
72 
99 
 
90 
 
80 
 
40 
60 
70 
60 
 
95 
 
100 
 
12 
98 
74 
74 
 
90 
 
80 
 
30 
75 
75 
65 
 
98 
 
100 
 
14 
99 
77 
1 ? 
Comteco -- Expansion goals 
Requests satisfied w/in time limits 
Modernization goals 
Digitalization 
Metas de calidad 
Incidence of faults(2) 
Correction of faults(3) 
Completed local calls 
Completed long distance calls 
 
70 
 
20 
 
0 ? 
- ? 
55 
55 
 
85.6 
 
29 
 
31 
62 
85 
97 
 
85 
 
60 
 
40 
50 
65 
60 
 
98 
 
63 
 
37 
63 
88 
88 
 
90 
 
80 
 
30 
75 
75 
70 
 
90 
 
100 
 
24 
76 
95 
92 
CELULAR       
Entel-movil -- Expansion goals 
Requests satisfied w/in time limits  
Quality goals 
Completed local calls 
Completed natl. long distance calls 
Completed internatl. long distance calls 
 
85 
 
70 
60 
55 
 
99 
 
86 
86 
86 
 
 
 
75 
64 
59 
 
nd 
 
92 
92 
92 
  
nd 
 
nd 
nd 
nd 
Telecel -- Expansion goals 
Requests satisfied w/in time limits  
Quality goals 
Completed local calls 
Completed natl. long distance calls 
Completed internatl. long distance calls 
 
85 
 
70 
60 
55 
 
99 
 
78 
76 
78 
 
 
 
75 
64 
59 
 
nd 
 
88.3 
86.5 
92.5 
  
nd 
 
nd 
nd 
nd 
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Fuente:  Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones 
 
In local phone services, the 1998 goals were achieved by the three largest 
cooperatives.  In some cases, the goals were fulfilled easily, as in the case of the 
percentage of digitalization achieved by COTAS and COTEL, or the percentage of 
completed calls attained by COTEL and COMTECO.  In other cases the objectives were 
just met, as in the percentage of calls completed at COTAS.  Only the case of COTEL 
reveals incomplete goals by 1999. 
In the case of cellular phone service, one sees that in all cases the operators, 
ENTEL-Movil and Telecel, achieved the 1998 expansion and quality goals.  In fact, most 
of these were achieved by 1997, which in part reflects the competitive pressures in this 
sector.  Indeed, data of the type we have here cannot really account for the fact that 
substantial welfare improvements may have come thanks to the mere existence of new 
services or substitutes like cellular telephony.  To the extent that Capitalization facilitated 
their arrival, one can credit it with welfare consequences along this dimension as well. 
 
V. Effects:  Regulatory performance 
 
As indicated above, the regulatory system (SIRESE) is made up of five sectoral  
(electricity, hydrocarbons, telecommunications, water and sewerage, and transportation) 
and a general Superintendence.  The system is financially and administratively 
independent, and Superintendents are appointed by congress for five-year periods56.  The 
functions that each Superintendence performs varies from sector to sector, although one 
can identify the most general activities as: granting rights, regulating tariffs for 
monopolies and oligopolies, promoting competition, monitoring operator obligations, 
resolving controversies among operators, imposing sanctions, hearing appeals, receiving 
consumer claims, supplying information on the regulated sectors, and proposing 
adjustments to the regulatory frameworks. 
Many positive changes came from the implementation of the SIRESE, besides the 
obvious one of firm and market regulation.  Some of these are the availability of 
increasingly transparent information, the strengthening of law and its procedures, and the 
system self evaluation and follow up done by the General Superintendence. 
In terms of appeals, the system has a first instance of appeal where any operator 
can reject a decision made by its sectoral Superintendence.  In case the decision is 
upheld, the operator has a second instance of appeal before the General Superintendence.  
Once the operator has exhausted these administrative instances, it can still appeal through 
the judiciary system.  Up to the year 2000, Table 20 shows an accumulated number of 
213 first instance appeals and 106 second instance appeals. 
 
                                                 
56 Seven years in the case of the General Superintendent. 
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Table 20 
Resolved first instance appeals, 1997-2000 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
First instance appeals by sector 
Electricity 9 14 13 41 77 
Hidrocarbons 2 7 3 7 19 
Water and sewerage 0 10 8 2 20 
Telecommunication 26 25 16 15 82 
Transportation 2 3 6 4 15 
Total 39 59 46 69 213 
Second instance appeals by sector 
Electricity 5 6 12 18 41 
Hidrocarbons 2 6 2 3 13 
Water and sewerage 0 3 3 2 8 
Telecommunications 14 12 5 5 36 
Transportation 1 3 2 2 8 
Total 22 30 24 30 106 
Source:  General Superintendence. 
 
The General Superintendence produces an annual evaluation of each sectoral 
Superintendence.  This document regards compliance with general functions as defined 
by law, internal organization and use of resources, and sector performance considering 
the regulatory objectives.   
The cost of the entire regulatory system was estimated at 0.2% of GDP in 1999.  
This investment has brought important advances, but its return has been restrained by 
several issues:  Instances of instability and lack of continuity of Superintendents due to 
political pressures, lack of a sector law in the cases of water (until 2000) and 
transportation, and slow approval of detailed regulations.  Additionally, at times operators 
have lobbied the executive and legislative branches to bypass the regulatory system.  
Some Superintendencies have also been slow to produce transparent information, and/or 
lacked specialized human resources in their earlier stages.  
 
VI. Effects:  macroeconomic aspects 
 
Capitalization also had significant impacts on macroeconomic variables, and is 
part of a broader transformation in the Bolivian economy.  The most visible consequence 
in this area is the increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) since 1994, partly explained 
by the capitalized firms’ activities, as shown in figure 14.  In the external sector, this had 
the effect of strengthening the balance of payments accounts and enhancing their 
sustainability.  The resilience of total FDI to the downturn that began in 1999 is an 
important factor in explaining why the recession in Bolivia has been less severe than that 
in some neighboring countries.57 
                                                 
57 Preliminary data suggests GDP growth began a very slow recovery starting in the year 2000. 
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Figure 14
FDI registered in the Balance of Payments
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In the national accounts, FDI helped raise investment from 13.5 percent of GDP 
in 1994 to 19.8 in 1999 (see Figure 15).  This investment was focused on several sectors:  
oil and natural gas, electricity, bottled gas and oil derivatives, telecommunications and 
transportation.  As one would expect, these sectors gained importance in GDP, relative to 
more traditional activities like mining. 
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Figure 15
Main macroeconomic variables as percent of GDP
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Furthermore, the decision to capitalize State firms was considered a “second 
generation” part of the reforms initiated in 1985, with the usual objective of leaving the 
private sector in charge of productive activities, in an environment of open markets and 
competition.  The State remained responsible for regulating, administering the law, 
ensuring macroeconomic stability, and investing in social sectors; all of these in an 
environment of decentralization and greater local participation. 
Figure 16 shows how the composition of public investment gradually came to 
reflect these priorities.  Although total investment increased by only 3.4 percent, the 
social sectors’ participation went up from 25 percent in 1994 to 50 percent in 1999.  
Investment in production also increased from 8.1 to 15.4 percent, largely reflecting 
greater support of the agricultural sector.  However, investment in the production of 
extractives decreased from 21.1 percent in 1994 to 1.3 in 1999, mainly due to withdrawal 
from hydrocarbons production.  The decline in infrastructure from 45.7 to 33.5 percent 
partially reflects withdrawal from the electricity, telecommunications, and transportation 
sectors.   
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Figure 16
Structure of goverment investment
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Social
Extractives
Production
Infrastructure
 
Capitalization also had an impact on the government’s budget deficit.  While in 
1990 the (before pensions) deficit was 4.4 percent of GDP, by 1994 it decreased to 1.8 
and by 1999 the government experienced a surplus of 0.2 percent.  A first increase in 
government income in 1994 and a second increase in 1998 contributed to closing the gap.  
However, mainly due to pension reform the budget deficit increased again from 1997 on, 
reaching 3.9 percent of GDP in 1999, and even higher levels more recently.   
Providing further data on public finances, Figure 18 shows that the increase in 
government income occurred mainly in tax collection and due to a new hydrocarbons tax, 
while income from the sales of hydrocarbons and its derivatives and sales from other 
government firms decreased substantially from 1995 on, due to reform.  Additionally, the 
regulated sectors (crude oil, natural gas, oil derivatives, electricity, bottled gas, 
communications and transportation) became first in tax contributions after 1995. 
 46
 47
Figure 17
Government income as percent of GDP
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To summarize, the capitalization reforms were part of a broader restructuring of 
the economy that had multiple indirect effects on households.  One highlight in this 
process is the increased importance of the social components in public expenditure, an 
aspect it seems to have helped bring about.  In the long run, this might be more beneficial 
to the poor than continued investment in sometimes inefficient productive sectors. 
 
VI. Political Economy 
 
 To complement the previous, technically-oriented discussion, in this section we 
describe some of the political economy of the implementation of Capitalization.  We also 
venture some hypotheses as to why this reform has proved relatively unpopular, when by 
our own assessments, it might seem relatively successful. 
 
 A. The promise of Capitalization  
 
As reviewed above, Bolivia initiated the transition from a State-led to a market-
driven economy in 1985.  Initially, this process focused on the liberalization of key prices 
and the promotion of market allocation mechanisms, with the goal of stopping 
hyperinflation and returning to macroeconomic stability. 
The Paz Estenssoro administration (1985-89) focused on the achievement and 
defense of stability, strict fiscal discipline, and the onset of structural reforms.  These 
included tax reform and a move towards independence for monetary authorities.  These 
measures had some of the intended result, since GDP growth recovered from negative 
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numbers in 1985, to 3.8 percent in 1989, with an investment level of 11 percent of GDP 
at the end of this period.   
In the next administration (Paz Zamora, 1989-93) the emphasis changed at least in 
principle from stability to growth, always within the general outlines of the economic 
model introduced in 1985.  During this period, the most important initiatives were a new 
Investment Law (to promote domestic and especially foreign investment), the 
Hydrocarbons Law and Mining Code (to attract foreign investment via joint ventures 
with YPFB and COMIBOL) and the Privatization Law.  The latter provided the 
framework to initiate privatizations with small State firms that were generally owned by 
(Public) regional development corporations.  For this purpose, the government also 
organized an office devoted to “reordering” State enterprises, establishing their number 
and characteristics in preparation for eventual privatization.  By 1993, growth reached 4.3 
percent, with a 15.7 investment rate. 
At this point the consensus was that despite having achieved stability, Bolivia 
needed significantly higher growth to lower poverty significantly.  In the free market 
setting implemented, this essentially implied the need to further promote foreign direct 
investment.  This was particularly clear to the extent that since stabilization in 1985, 
domestic private investment never really took off, and on average, domestic firms did not 
seem to have developed the capacity to compete in global markets. 
Further, macroeconomic stability itself was repeatedly in question, given that 
various levels of government were still heavily involved in production, and that public 
investment was still the engine of growth.  This investment, further, had to meet multiple 
needs such as those in electricity, water, sewerage, telecommunications, transportation, 
and oil exploration – let alone growing priorities in health and education.  This situation, 
coupled with pressure from international organizations like the World Bank, made it clear 
that privatization was the path to follow. 
The Sanchez de Lozada administration (1993-97) was perhaps the most 
aggressive in structural reform.  Capitalization was only a part of overall changes that 
included significant administrative decentralization, greater local participation, and 
pension reform.  In general, there were two emphases: 1) the transfer of productive 
activities to the private sector, and 2) the sharing of social area responsibilities with local 
jurisdictions.  The first required sector-by-sector reform to establish the conditions under 
which the private sector would participate.  The second required reform of the 
government itself.  While the first was mostly efficiency oriented, the second was 
directed to distributional issues.   
The Capitalization mechanism described in section II, initially promised that a 51 
percent share of each firm would remain in Bolivian hands.  This would accomplish a 
double objective:  first, it would democratize business ownership; second, it would 
stimulate investment and generate broad-based growth.  Thus, the promise was one of 
growth and efficiency, coupled with a sense of social equity embodied in the effort to 
avoid further wealth-concentration.   
At the time of implementation, the promise of majority control by Bolivians at 
large had to be abandoned.  Foreign enterprises demanded at least a 50 percent share and 
control of each company, and without this concession it would have been difficult to 
allay their fear of heavy-handed intervention.  In exchange, the argument went, this 
guaranteed managerial and technological improvements.  In addition, the fact that foreign 
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firms’ payments would be invested (rather than go into government coffers), would 
promote increases in coverage rates, quality, and employment.   
At least in part, this last feature seemed directed towards reducing the fear that the 
government, awash in “found money” would immediately spend it on social or 
infrastructure projects that, however well-intentioned, would not have a large impact on 
economic development (this even ignoring the possibility that corrupt politicians might 
get a hold of these resources). 
 
B.  Conflicts during the capitalization process 
 
The approval of the Capitalization Law in March of 1994 initiated the process.  
This law authorized the executive power to contribute the assets of State firms to the 
creation of Sociedades Anónimas Mixtas (SAM’s) or mixed enterprises.  The Law 
authorized the transfer of portions of these firms to their workers, and to the population at 
large.  Additionally, it allowed the government to sell new, capital increasing shares, in 
international auctions. 
The Law’s approval was feasible because the political party in government had a 
congressional majority thanks to a coalition with some smaller parties.58  This majority 
was also key for the approval of all the other relevant laws mentioned above, which 
enabled the executive to then detail their application through extensive decretos 
reglamentarios.  The opposition parties59 consistently claimed that the laws promoted by 
the government, including the Capitalization Law, were prepared and approved without 
regard to any opposition or debate. 
A critical aspect during this process, once the key laws had been approved, was 
the position of organized labor.  In this area two forces came into play.  On the one hand, 
the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), the broadest labor organization, expressed its 
opposition to the whole process.  On the other, the government made the decision to turn 
the workers into partial owners, as a way of ensuring their support. 
From the start, the COB, which had been much weakened since the 1980’s, 
rejected the idea of capitalization, arguing instead for a strengthening of the State firms’ 
financial and managerial condition.  While it stuck to this position, it was unable to stop 
direct contacts between the government and the workers and employee unions in the 
firms that were to be capitalized.  While these initially stuck by the COB, one by one 
their respective leaders initiated direct contacts with the government, seeking to achieve 
the best deal for their members. 
Capitalization itself began with ENDE, perhaps in part because its workers were 
not as organized as those in other state firms.  In any event, they were the first to agree to 
partial ownership in exchange for supporting the process.  ENTEL workers were the 
second group to fall in line, after negotiating an agreement by which benefits as well as 
job security were guaranteed.  YPFB’s capitalization was made viable in a similar way, 
and the workers obtained a particularly important share in Transredes. 
                                                 
58 The main political party in government was the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), which 
acted in coalition with Unión Cívica Solidaridad (UCS), Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL) and 
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari (MRTK). 
59 Mainly the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) and Acción Democrática Nacionalista 
(ADN). 
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In the case of ENFE, the government guaranteed job security for a seven-month 
period.  In this case however, the workers obtained a relatively small ownership share.  
The sale price of this firm took place at a final price below book value, an outcome that 
the workers perhaps foresaw.  The union at LAB was the one which most strongly 
opposed Capitalization.  In the event, it also came around with guarantees of job security.   
 Industry-specific conflict rose particularly in the telecommunications sector, 
where the government aimed at transferring ENTEL (with a period of exclusivity) in the 
long distance market, as well as introducing competition in the local sector.  However, 
the independent cooperatives that provided local phone services strongly opposed giving 
up their monopolies.  The government replied asking that they at least transform into 
fully private firms in order to attract private investment and eventually compete in open 
markets.  This was also rejected by the cooperatives, more so, they continued to demand 
a period of exclusivity in the local service.  The government went along with this, but 
imposed price cap regulation together with expansion and quality goals. 
 
C.  Criticisms of capitalization 
  
Not surprisingly, the capitalization process lent itself to criticism.  The following 
issues were the focus of much debate: 
1) The notion that the State enterprises to be capitalized only benefited a small 
group of bureaucrats and politicians – that these firms were a source of corruption and 
rent-seeking behavior.  The workers of state enterprises rejected this idea, arguing that 
some of the corruption, and inefficiency in these firms had been introduced or aggravated 
by the free market reforms the government now wanted to carry even further. 
2) The concept that Bolivians would have a majority stake in the new enterprises, 
one that would never be less than 51 percent.  For many, this was an electoral sleight of 
hand, since in practice investors would not settle for less than 50 percent, plus control.  
The government objected to this characterization, arguing that investors in fact wanted 51 
percent, but that thanks to its negotiation, they settled for less.  
 3) The idea that foreign management would allow technological and managerial 
skill transfer, reducing corruption.  This affirmation caused strong reactions among the 
workers, since State firms (some more than others) had historically propelled 
modernization in different sectors.  They called on the public to recall that in some cases 
factors exogenous to the firms, such as the 1980’s debt crisis, accounted for why their 
sources of funding had dried up.  Indeed, it was the lack of investment capital and foreign 
funding that was the key justification for Capitalization.  
 4) The possibility that State enterprises might be transferred in a “fire sale”.  
Some observers made the point that perhaps the government created the conditions for a 
fire sale itself, by publicizing the poor state of some of these firms.  People suspected that 
the government would have to absorb substantial debts, and in the case of gas and oil, 
investors would be rewarded with risk-free reserves. 
  
 D. Change of government 
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The next administration (Banzer-Quiroga, 1997-2000)60 had made a campaign 
promise to revert the Capitalization process.  After taking office it proposed to at least 
introduce some changes in the contracts, and in the functioning of the regulatory system.  
This created unease in the affected sectors, however, and the issue was put to rest by the 
World Bank’s insistence that the contracts should not be affected; and the American 
Embassy’s advocacy in favor of U.S. firms. 
This forced the new administration to coexist with capitalization, a coexistence 
with constant criticisms of the arrangement, with key officials expressing that the 
government firms were given away in exchange for nothing, that their transfer limited the 
government’s income, reducing expenditure and social investment.  Additionally, it was 
alleged that it caused the recession that started in this time period, and accounted for the 
government’s inability to spend the country’s way out of it. 
MNR, the ruling party during capitalization, now in opposition, retorted that the 
Capitalization process had not met all expectations in part because it did not have the 
necessary continuity.  It argued that reform was left in the hands of people that did not 
understand or stimulate it. It also made the case that the recession was due to external 
factors, and that it in fact would have been worse had Capitalization not taken place.   
Nevertheless, the MNR also admitted that the reforms had not been perfect and 
might require some adjustments, particularly the strengthening of laws and regulation.  
For instance, while capitalization/regulation may have made possible the increase in 
natural gas reserves from 5 to 53 TCF (potentially turning Bolivia in a regionally 
important exporter) some adjustments were necessary to improve the government’s share 
and to prevent the emergence of vertical monopolies. 
 
A. Why is capitalization not popular? 
 
As this discussion suggests, the conception and implementation of these processes 
involved a fair amount of controversy and acrimony, and they themselves can be seen as 
an initial source of capitalization’s relative unpopularity.  In addition, here we venture 
some further hypotheses that fall in three general areas:  i) unfulfilled expectations, ii) 
ownership and corporate governance issues, and iii) high profile failures. 
The first of these arises because in our opinion Capitalization was “oversold” by 
the administration that implemented it, along dimensions including the employment 
growth it would generate, and the dividends it would eventually generate for the 
population at large.  Performance on these fronts, while perhaps not bad, has proven 
disappointing given the expectations generated.   
In the case of employment, for instance, intuition tells us to expect declines in 
employment with privatization, to the extent that we believe that all else equal, State 
firms may have an inefficiently large number of workers.  When we find that declines 
were quite modest, especially in the context of the size of the whole labor force, we feel 
things were not so bad, especially since these firms’ investment focused on capital-
intensive nontradeables.  
                                                 
60 Hugo Banzer was the President for four years out of the whole five-year term.  He resigned due to ill 
health and amid significant opposition (dying before the end of this period).  Jorge Quiroga, the vice-
president, took over for the remaining year. 
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The population, however, was told to expect that Capitalization would lead to 
large improvements both in the quantity and quality of jobs available.  In fact, the rate of 
employment growth during the post-Capitalization years (even those before the current 
recession) was not qualitatively different from that experienced in previous periods of 
stability, and the average voter may therefore feel disappointed. 
A second set of problems highlights corporate governance issues.   Here we feel 
that the population suspects that even if output, productivity, and consumer welfare have 
improved, the capitalized enterprises are being run with only the best interests of the 
majority (foreign) owners in mind, and that the regulatory system has been unable to 
adequately restrain this natural tendency. 
This issue has gained particular salience with respect to ownership.  The 
population seems to have expected that through its (roughly 45 percent) share in the 
capitalized enterprises, it would come to share in profits flows.  In the event, the firms 
have not paid dividends as large as were predicted (Transredes, for instance, has yet to 
pay a dividend), and these have had a direct impact only on the old-age population.  The 
suspicion is that the firms have found ways to transfer profits to their home countries 
rather than pay then out in Bolivia.  
This has become a particular headache for the current Sanchez de Lozada 
administration (2002-2007), which has at its helm both the President and the Party who 
initially implemented Capitalization.  One of its key campaign promises was to return the 
Bonosol (the old-age payment described above) to its initial level of about 240 dollars.  
Due to the low flow of dividends, however, the Common Capitalization Fund (FCC), 
which must pay for this benefit simply cannot afford it. 
As a short-term solution, the government is implicitly forcing individuals, through 
their individual retirement accounts (FCI), to buy commitments from the FCC.  There is 
much debate over this arbitrary measure, which in the extreme can be seen as a 
confiscation and forceful redistribution of private property by the very administration that 
in previous incarnations was its staunch defender.   
As a medium term solution, the government is seeking to strengthen corporate 
governance, particularly in light of recent allegations of white-collar crime in capitalized 
oil enterprises.  The initial proposed changes have not been well received by the business 
and financial communities.  Of course, these problems have been accorded further 
salience by news of the deluge of corporate scandals in the U.S.   
A further and important wrinkle on this issue arises in the case of the Gas 
industry.  On the one hand the public is told that Bolivia’s proven and expected reserves 
have expanded enormously since capitalization, and that this will generate great wealth 
for the country.  On the other, they might wander if and how this wealth will ever reach 
them.  Those who look carefully, for instance, will find that those companies in which the 
population owns shares, mainly Chaco, Andina and Transredes, are arguably no longer 
the central players in this industry, so that the vaunted windfall gains may in fact accrue 
to firms in which they have no stake. 
Further, there are developments that might lead people to believe that in fact the 
system is evolving in a way that will result in further losses in participation.  At the 
moment the population can be said to be gaining from royalties on gas production and 
what seems to be the relatively good (previously-negotiated) price of gas sold to Brazil.  
On the other hand, from the 1990 to the 1996 legislation, the royalty share fell from 50 to 
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18 percent, and in the future the gains will be smaller as “old” wells, those discovered 
prior to privatization, become less important.   
Although these drops are to be compensated by the increase in profit taxes and the 
introduction of a so-called surtax, in practice these sources of revenue have not and are 
not expected to compensate for the reduction, except through greater production volumes.  
Additionally, there is a public perception that the capitalized firms are very adept at 
evading taxes.  Recently, for instance, a prominent politician made the charge (to our 
knowledge left uncontested/unexplained by the capitalized firms), that the Bolivian 
Catholic University pays more taxes than any of the capitalized oil enterprises. 
 The gas industry has provided popular opinion with other examples of potential 
corporate malfeasance in collusion with government officials.  For instance, in the 
negotiations with Brazil, the giant San Alberto and San Antonio fields were classified as 
new (hence paying substantially lower royalties), but YPFB workers insisted these had 
already been discovered.  While the status of these fields was never entirely clarified, 
substantial parts of the public were left with the impression that excessive concessions 
had been made. 
 Finally a couple of high profile failures among foreign firms have introduced 
suspicions among the public as to the entire process.  This was the case of the Brazilian 
airline VASP which failed in the administration of LAB.  VASP departed amidst 
allegations of asset stripping and accounting fraud.  Additionally, there was the case of 
the Aguas del Tunari consortium, which led to the “water war” (described above) and an 
end to water-related concessions. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
The 1982-85 crisis provided Bolivia with an opportunity to initiate the transition 
from a State-led to a market-driven economy.  By 1989 it had liberated key prices in the 
economy, and by 1993 a Privatization Law was in place.  However, the State continued to 
be the main investor in the economy, and remained highly dependent on foreign debt.  
Although the economy resumed growth, it did so at rates that would not lower poverty 
significantly.   
The 1993-97 period became the most aggressive in structural reform in two fronts:  
1) the definition of a new State-market frontier, where government firms were replaced 
by privatization and regulation, and 2) the definition of a new central-local frontier within 
the State, where local governments are given greater participation.  These two definitions 
implied that the private sector (particularly foreign) would lead investment and growth, 
while the State would regulate markets and increase its efficiency in the provision of 
public and quasi-public goods.   
Independently of the mechanism used to attract foreign direct investment (mainly 
capitalization), the result was the substitution of government foreign debt with foreign 
direct investment as the engine of growth.  By the end of 1998, the economy had reached 
5.3% GDP growth, but the country was hit by a series of external shock that began with 
the Asian crisis and continued with the Brazilian and later the Argentinian crisis.  The 
economy was pulled into a recession that persists to date.  By the end of 2002 private 
sector investment fell substantially, forcing a return of government  (debt financed) 
investment as the main source of growth.  Although this time in an environment were its 
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limited resources can only be directed towards the production of public and quasi-public 
goods. 
The importance of this bit of history, is that any evaluation of capitalization and 
privatization must consider them as part of a structural reform aimed at achieving broader 
objectives.  It also highlights the existence of two different periods under which 
capitalization/regulation had to perform.  The first from 1994 to the end of 1998 
corresponds to a period of reform implementation and initial results in an environment of 
stability and economic growth.  The second from 1999 to present corresponds to a period 
of reform consolidation in an environment of economic recession. 
 With this context aside, it is clear that a complete evaluation of the 
Capitalization/privatization in Bolivia is a difficult task, and this paper admittedly 
provides only initial insights into this issue.  At the simplest level, the key goal of 
capitalization seems to have been to attract foreign investment into the affected sectors, 
and the evidence suggests the process met with success on this dimension.  In 
combination with regulation, additional positive outcomes would seem to include an 
increase in access to utilities’ services and significant expansions in proven gas reserves – 
both outcomes which generate benefits that have not bypassed the poorer segments of 
society.  Additionally, we find evidence of productivity increases almost across the 
board; and most firms have remained moderately profitable. 
 On the negative side, one observes employment decreases, though these  are the 
partial flipside of the productivity increases, and in any case seem to be rather small, 
particularly relative to the economy as a whole.  We also find evidence of price increases 
for utilities, although except for the case of water, they seem to be overwhelmed by 
increases in access.  
 On balance, this assessment suggests the reforms were fairly successful, 
but popular opinion does not seem to agree with this assessment.  Here we venture that 
this may be due to the fact that that the government that implemented these reforms 
“oversold” them, promising more, on the job creation front for instance, than they could 
reasonably deliver.  Additionally, the reform’s entire reputation has been hurt by a couple 
of high profile failures, and by a perceived weakness in the regulatory and corporate 
governance frameworks in Bolivia. 
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Appendix A – Household surveys 
 
For household and individual-level data, including socio-economic 
characterizations, we use two rounds of the Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (1st and 7th 
round) and one of the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (1st round), as described in table B. 
 
Table B 
Household survey data 
 
Data set Year 
collected 
Coverage Sample size 
(households) 
Encuesta Integrada de Hogares, 1st round 1989 Department capitals1 3,765 
Encuesta Integrada de Hogares, 7th round 1994 Department capitals1 6,102 
Encuesta Continua de Hogares  1999 National 1,3252 
Note:  1 Includes the country’s eight department capitals (excluding Cobija) and El Alto. 
           2 For comparability, this sample refers only to the department capitals covered in 1989 and 1994. 
 
These surveys contain the essential access and consumption information.  As the 
telecommunications, telephone, and water reforms took place in 1995 and 1996, the 1994 
survey is our “before” observation, and 1999 the “after” one.  We also focus on 1989 
because the 1989-1994 five year period can serve as a “control” for the 1994-99 
privatization period. This comparison is aided because the country had a similar 
economic performance and relatively stable political structure during both periods. 
 For employment and wage information, we have started collecting administrative 
data from firms and regulatory agencies, and some results on this are featured below.  In 
principle, the household surveys can provide complementary information, but we have 
concluded that this will be the case for only rather aggregated information.  The reason 
for this is that as illustrated in the next section, the firms in the three sectors considered 
here (water, electricity, and telecommunications) are relatively small employers in 
Bolivia, and the household surveys offer very small samples to study them.   
To illustrate this problem, we note that the 1999 survey asked respondents to state 
not only the sector but also the precise firm they worked for.  In the electric sector, we 
did not find a single respondent that declared he or she worked for the electric firms 
mentioned in the section II.  Rather, many of them worked in the “electric” sector, but as 
electricians or electric appliance vendors.  In light of this, the administrative information 
on employment and wage levels will be valuable indeed. 
 Finally, we will complement these sources of data with additional administrative 
information on quality-related issues. 
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Appendix B – Access definitions and questions used 
 
Electricity 1 --  A definition fully consistent across the three years, based on households’ 
declaration as to whether they have an electric connection or not. 
Telephone 1   -- A straightforward definition based based on households’ declaration as 
to whether they have a telephone connection or not, available only for 1994 and 1999. 
Telephone 2  -- The central criteria in this case is whether households reported positive 
communications expenditure, available in 1989 and 1999. 
Telephone 3 -- The central criteria in this case is whether households reported positive 
expenditure on telephone service, available in 1994 and 1999. 
Water 1 – Under this criteria, a household is considered connected if it declares it has a 
water connection either inside its dwelling or else within the building its dwelling is a 
part of.  This measure is available in all three years. 
Water 2 – In this case, a household is considered connected if it declares it has a water 
connection either inside its dwelling.  This measure is available in all three years. 
 
Table C1 
Access to water, electricity and telephone services: Coding for 1989 
 
Service Access Question  Possible answers Variable name  
/ coding 
Con-
nection 
How does your 
household supply itself 
with water?   
Public network: 
1. Inside the dwelling 
2. Outside the dwelling but within the 
building that the dwelling is part of. 
3. Outside the dwelling, outside the 
building (public faucet). 
4. Private network 
Well: 
5. Private 
6. Shared 
7. River, lake, or spring 
8. Delivery truck 
9. Other 
Water 1:  household is 
connected if responses 1 
or 2 were given 
 
Water 2:  household is 
connected only if answer 
1 was given 
Water  
Con-
sumption 
How much did your 
household spend last 
month on water? 
Amount in bolivianos Water expenditure 
Con-
nection 
Does your household’s 
dwelling have an 
electric connection? 
Yes or no Electricity 1: household 
connected if yes 
Electri-
city 
Con-
sumption 
How much did your 
household spend last 
month on electricity? 
Amount in bolivianos Electricity expenditure 
Tele-
phone 
Con-
nection 
How much did your 
household spend last 
month on telephone? 
Amount in bolivianos Telephone 2: household 
connected if it reported 
positive expenditure on 
telephone service 
 Con-
sumption 
How much did your 
household spend last 
month on telephone? 
Amount in bolivianos Telephone expenditure 
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Table C2 
Access to water, electricity and telephone services: Coding for 1994 
 
Service Type of 
access 
Question in the survey Possible answers Variable name  
/ coding 
Con-
nection 
How does you 
household supply itself 
with water? 
Public or private network: 
1. Inside the dwelling 
2. Outside the dwelling but within the 
house or building the dwelling is part 
of. 
3. Outside the dwelling, outside the 
house or building (public faucet). 
4. Delivery truck 
5. Well 
6. River, lake or spring 
7. Other 
Water 1: The household 
is connected if responses 
1 or 2 were given 
 
Water 2: The household 
is connected only if 
answer 1 was given 
Water  
Con-
sumption 
How much do you pay 
for this each month? 
Amount in bolivianos Water expenditure 
Con-
nection 
Does your household 
have electric energy? 
Yes or no Electricity 1: household 
connected if yes 
Electri-
city 
Con-
sumption 
How much do you pay 
for this each month? 
Amount in bolivianos Electricity expenditure 
Con-
nection 
 
Household equipment:  
Does your household 
have a telephone 
connection? 
 
In the last month, how 
much did you or any of 
the members of your 
household spend on 
communications 
(phone, mail service) 
Yes or no 
 
 
 
 
Amount in bolivianos 
Telephone 1: household 
connected if reports it 
has a telephone 
connection. 
 
Telephone 3: household 
connected if it reported 
positive expenditure on 
communications 
 
Tele-
phone 
Con-
sumption 
In the last month, how 
much did you or any of 
the members of your 
household spend on 
communications 
(phone, mail service) 
Amount in bolivianos Telephone expenditure 
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Table C3 
Access to water, electricity and telephone services: Coding for 1999 
 
 
Service Type of 
access 
Question in the survey Possible answers Variable name  
/ coding 
Con-
nection 
What is the origin of the 
drinking and cooking 
water the household 
uses? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In your dwelling, how 
is the water used to 
drink and cook 
distributed? 
1. Network that reaches the building 
2. Public faucet 
3. Well with a pump 
4. Well without a pump 
5. River or spring 
6. Lake 
7. Delivery truck 
8. Other 
 
1. Pipe within the dwelling (reaching 
the bathroom or kitchen) 
2. Pipe outside the dwelling 
but within the plot of land 
3. No piped water 
Water 1: The household 
is connected if response 
1 was given for the first 
question, and not 
otherwise 
 
Water 2:  The household 
is connected only if 
answer 1 is given for 
both questions 
Water  
Con-
sumption 
In the last month, how 
much did you pay for 
potable water? 
Amount in bolivianos Water expenditure 
Con-
nection 
Does you use electricity 
to illuminate your 
dwelling? 
Yes or no Electricity 1: household 
connected if yes 
Electri-
city 
Con-
sumption 
In the last month, how 
much did you spend on 
electric service? 
Amount in bolivianos Electricity expenditure 
Con-
nection 
 
Does your household 
have  fixed or cellular 
phone service? 
 
In the last month, how 
much did you spend on 
fixed or cellular phone 
service? 
 
In the last three months, 
how much did your 
household spend on 
communications 
(telephone, long 
distance, letters, 
packages, etc.) 
Yes or no 
 
 
 
Amount in bolivianos 
 
 
 
 
Amount in bolivianos 
Telephone 1: household 
connected if reports it 
has a telephone 
connection 
 
Telephone 2: household 
connected if it reported 
positive expenditure on 
telephone service 
 
Telephone3: household 
connected if it reported 
positive expenditure on 
communications 
 
Tele-
phone 
Con-
sumption 
In the last month, how 
much did you spend on 
fixed or cellular phone 
service? 
Amount in bolivianos Telephone expenditure 
 
  
 
